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I. INTRODUCTION
Open virtually any newspaper, news magazine or
periodical, or listen to any news broadcast or news commentary
program, and you likely will see or hear abundant reports and
commentaries regarding something at once most remarkable and
even more so, worrisome, indeed nerve-racking to those who
respect the Constitution and its rule of law. The relevant matter
concerns the sitting President of the United States and applicable
constitutional law regarding that executive officer's singular,
unilateral authority to pardon or otherwise dispense clemency-
that is, to mitigate the punishment of convicted felons and, indeed,
to pardon preemptively both individuals and classes of persons as
the President sees fit.
As part of the structure of American government arising
from both a specific provision of the United States Constitution
and centuries-old tradition, the office of chief executives-at the
federal level, the President, and at the state level, governors-
includes the authority to grant various forms of clemency to
convicted felons. Clemency ranges from lessening the duration or
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conditions of sentences to full pardons that completely rescind any
remaining punishment and essentially nullify the criminal
conviction itself.' The theories of executive clemency in general
and pardons in particular are much in the news because of various
congressional and Department of Justice investigations concerning
possible criminal and civil offenses involving both Donald Trump,
arguably America's least qualified yet most arrogant President, and
members of his equally inexperienced and maladroit inner circle of
advisors including his namesake eldest son and his son-in-law. 2
Even as these words are being written, FBI special counsel Robert
Mueller's thoroughgoing investigation has led to the arrest and
plea agreement of members of the Trump campaign and
administration, one of whom, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn,
formerly a respected member of the military, acted as a particularly
ardent and effective campaign advisors of then-candidate Trump,
and served thereafter, for a short but lively period, as President
Trump's National Security Advisor.
As this article will underscore, settled law holds that the
Constitution's Due Process Clauses contained in its Fifth3 and
Fourteenth Amendments 4 cover and constrain the entirety of
"The term 'clemency' is a comprehensive term that has come to be used for all
types of relief available pursuant to the pardon power, to avoid confusion with
the narrower technical use of the term 'pardon[.]"' Margaret Colgate Love, Of
Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President's Duty to Be
Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1483, 1484 n.4 (2000).
2 The possible crimes and civil affronts include actions taken by Trump and
senior members of his staff during his highly contentious presidential campaign
against the Democratic Party nominee, former Secretary of State, former New
York Senator, and former First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, and actions
which, in significant measure, continued into the formative months of his
presidency. See generally John Norris & Carolyn Kenney, Donald Trump and
Criminal Conspiracy Law: A RICO Explainer, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 7,
2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/
2017/12/07/443833/donald-trump-criminal-conspiracy-law/.
The Fifth Amendment states in part, "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part, "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. That text seemingly denotes "due process" and "equal
protection" as two separate and implicitly distinct constraints on state actions;
the federal courts, however, rightly explain that, in fact, "equal protection of the
laws" is an offshoot or subset of "due process of law." E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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American government at all levels, regarding all official conduct
performed by all offices--even including executive clemency
authority, which is a realm that otherwise accords the President
and appropriate state officers, often governors, essentially
unfettered discretion. Plausible speculation informs that, as
President, Trump is considering whether to issue a series of post-
conviction and preemptive pardons to both himself and to those
under investigation for alleged illegal interactions,5 some of which
are often hastily and perhaps improperly denoted as "collusion,"
with Russian officials during the Trump campaign, transition, and
the beginning of his administration. The serious prospect of
blanket or mass pardons for his political associates makes the issue
of due process constraints on the Executive's clemency discretion
of utmost urgency. The specter of Trump attempting to nullify
criminal convictions and other upshots stemming from bona fide
investigations against him and his associates, plus resulting judicial
challenges, articles of impeachment, and other conceivable
governmental responses to such acts of claimed clemency, loom
large indeed as constitutional concerns, perhaps constitutional
crises.6
Accordingly, the link between due process of law and
executive clemency, with particular emphasis on arguably
politically motivated self and blanket pardons, is the subject of this
article. While any American President's realm of discretion to
pardon and otherwise grant forms of clemency is both enormous
' See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Mass Pardons Would Escalate Risks for Trump,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/
articles/2017-10-31/mass-pardons-would-escalate-risks-for-trump.
6 One commentator recently opined:
America is on its way to a full-blown constitutional crisis.
Over just a few days last week, President Trump and his allies
stepped up attacks on Robert Mueller, the special counsel
investigating the campaign's connections to Russia. They
tried to push Attorney General Jeff Sessions out of office.
They thought out loud about whether the president can pardon
himself. This all points to the same conclusion: Mr. Trump is
willing to deal a major blow to the rule of law-and the
American Republic-in order to end an independent
investigation into his Russia ties.
Yascha Mounk, The Past Week Proves That Trump Is Destroying Our
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/01/opinion/trump-democracy-institutions-destroyed.html.
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and from a practical sense often unreviewable, the judiciary rightly
has discerned that, for the sake of preserving the liberty
vouchsafed by the Constitution, the Executive's pardoning power
has constitutional limits. Consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine, those limits may be determined as a matter of politics by
Congress should it decide to impeach a sitting President for
perceived misuse of executive clemency authority. Even more
fundamentally, however, especially given the unlikelihood of
presidential impeachment, the constitutional limits of executive
clemency may be discerned and enforced through judicial review
particularly addressing the Due Process Clauses.
Contrary to much commentary and possibly some
seemingly settled law, this essay argues that an American President
(or a similarly situated state officer or office) may issue individual
and "blanket"-or mass-clemency benefitting classes of named
or unnamed individuals, and in addition may pardon himself, but
only if doing so comports with the principles of fundamental
fairness that define due process of law under the Constitution's
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the Constitution
permits acts of clemency to foster mercy, compassion, and
forgiveness, or to promote the purported best interests of the
nation, or even to further an executive's political advantages,
unless such clemency is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary
to justice and liberty, and thus unconstitutionally unfair.
Specifically, this article proceeds as follows: Part II
presents the meaning of due process of law, accenting that,
pursuant to the Due Process Clauses, all actions of whatever kind
taken by any office or agent of government must be moral;
meaning that official conduct may not be arbitrary, capricious or
otherwise violate recognized tenets of fundamental fairness.
Although not so acknowledging, the Supreme Court's definition of
fundamental fairness is based on concepts of human dignity
espoused by the Enlightenment moral philosopher Immanuel Kant.
This article's understanding of constitutional law is controversial
but based on the author's long-standing research that confirms
"due process of law's" inextricable link to principles of immutable,
a political morality discerned through impartial reason and
applicable regardless of what outcomes may occur.
Part III briefly sets forth relevant constitutional aspects of
executive clemency, including the legal requirement that acts of
clemency comport with the strictures of due process of law. Part
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IV then explains why governmental chief executives including the
President may self-pardon, issue blanket pardons, or do both so
long as those actions and similar grants of clemency comply with
applicable due process standards. As is traditional, this writing
ends with a brief conclusion, herein Part V.
II. THE MEANING OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
This article begins with a very brief discussion of the true
meaning of due process of law under the Constitution's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. While strictly only the Fifth
Amendment is applicable to presidential pardons, as it controls the
actions of federal level actors of which the President arguably is
the single most important,7 the Supreme Court rightly has
determined that the meaning of due process is identical for both
amendments.8  Accordingly, whatever due process constraints
apply to acts of presidential clemency likewise apply to those of
state governors or such other offices as particular states have
authorized to consider matters of clemency.
I have extrapolated the meaning of due process of law in
considerable detail in an earlier work. 9 Moreover, what I consider
to be my most comprehensive explication of American due process
morality and law, the forthcoming article Deontological
Originalism: Moral Truth, Liberty, and, Constitutional "Due
' See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-50 (1833). Even as of this
writing, while essentially the entirety of its protections have been declared
likewise duties of the states, technically to this day the Bill of Rights is
inapplicable as law to the states. Id.; see, e.g., Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis,
596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Barron, "The Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, applies only to the federal
government."); Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (Sixth
Amendment read alone applies only to federal prosecutions).
8 See Great American Houseboat Co. v. U.S., 780 F.2d 741, 746 n.3 (9th Cir.
1986) (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Regan v.
Tax'n With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 542 n.2 (1983))
("While the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment are applicable only to the states, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment imposes on the federal government the same obligations that the
fourteenth amendment imposes on the states.").
9 See Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution Is
a "Suicide Pact, " 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 370403 (2011).
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Process, " has been accepted for publication.'o For a
thoroughgoing explication of the complex meaning of due process
of law, I would be flattered if the reader consulted those
publications. For the purposes of this writing, I present a
shortened but essentially usable synopsis.
A. Due Process is the "Value Monism" of the Constitution
As an opening point, this writing agrees with philosophers
who argue that within any conceptual system, especially those
sounding in or predicated on moral theory:
[T]here must be some source of harmony; that is, all
separate . . . norms [and standards] must cohere
through one overarching, unifying concept that
serves as the pivot for resolving any [relevant]
quandary... . Thus, managing discrete ... rules and
their functions requires a foundational conception-
a paradigmatic idea, [an] elementary particle that
enables, delineates, invigorates and clarifies the
entire [applicable] philosophy. Professor Wood
calls this "value monism. . . ." I1
Consistent with this theory of moral philosophy, while
other constitutional provisions such as the Ninth Amendment1 2 or
the Constitution's Privileges and Immunities clauses might have
attained ascendency, 13 the judiciary has designated "due process of
law" as what may aptly be denoted the Constitution's "value
monism." That is, due process is the particular legal construct
from which each and every other constitutional fundamental right
10 That article is forthcoming in two parts at THUR. MARSHALL L. REv. and is
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3043895.
" Bayer, supra note 9, at 304 (citing ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 59
(2008)).
12 "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
13 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-And-Seizure History: Now-
Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original
Understanding of "Due Process of Law, " 77 Miss. L. J. 1, 195 (2007)
(discussing the Reconstruction Court's emphasis on "privileges and
immunities").
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derives.14 Thus, a half-century ago, surveying the panoply of
discrete, individual rights set forth in the Constitution, particularly
its Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court in In re Gault aptly
explained, "Due process of law is the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term
in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and
delimits the powers which the state may exercise." 15 Identically,
Justice Felix Frankfurter fittingly and vividly declared that due
process vouchsafes, "ultimate decency in a civilized society."1 6
True, this full extent of due process, as the Constitution's
value monism, arguably was not apparent from the early post-
Revolution and post-Civil War debates discussing those clauses in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 7  But, perhaps such
specific clarifications in 1791 or 1868 were unnecessary-for, as
the Supreme Court affirmed well over a century ago, "due process
of law" is "a principle of natural equity, recognized by all
temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal
sense of its justice." 8  Accordingly, while not actually so
identified in the constitutional text, all fundamental rights,
including those specifically listed in the Bill of Rights, emanate
from and are discrete instances of the an overarching, paradigmatic
idea this nation has expressed as "due process of law." But
nothing less would be expected of a concept that conveys "ultimate
decency in a civilized society."19
This article will very briefly prove the foregoing first by
explaining what popularly is called "selective incorporation,"
which discloses when due process of law requires States to abide
14 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
15 Id.
16 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17 "The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment sheds little light on
how the term 'due process of law' was understood in 1868, because the
Amendment was presented and debated largely in terms of the 'privileges and
immunities' of citizens." Davies, supra note 13, at 195. Professor Paul
Finkelman likewise concluded, "Virtually all supporters of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment agreed that it would protect the 'civil rights' of blacks and everyone
else, but . . . they did not necessarily agree on the substantive content of civil
rights, equal protection, or even due process." Paul Finkelman, Original Intent
and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of Constitutional Law, 89
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1019, 1026 (2014).
18 Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897).
19 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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by the Bill of Right's specifically enumerated provisions. As I
summarized a few years ago:
[I]t is axiomatic constitutional law that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not fully incorporate that is, it does not per se
mandate onto the states the rights set forth in the
Bill of Rights. Rather, through a right-by-right
review, the judiciary has applied to the States
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment those
provisions of the Bill of Rights that derive from the
American "scheme of ordered liberty and system of
justice." In other words, due process requires
states and localities to respect those rights essential
to the very legitimacy of governmental conduct.20
Given that they are important enough to have been
commemorated in the Bill of Rights, under "selective
incorporation," essentially every right therein has been deemed
indispensable to civil society and thus mandatory upon the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Aside
from a very few as yet un-litigated, the sole exceptions are: the
Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict; the Fifth
Amendment requirement of indictment by a grand jury; and the
right to a jury in civil litigation contained in the Seventh
Amendment.2 1
Along with selective incorporation, the judicial canon
recognizing unenumerated fundamental rights-rights not
specifically set forth within the Constitution's text-verifies the
innate supremacy of due process of law. For instance, the Sixth
Amendment famously includes a textual "confrontation clause"
confirming that criminal defendants may confront, usually through
cross-examination, witnesses that the Government calls to testify. 2 2
Interestingly, the Constitution does not expressly contain an
affirmative equivalent permitting criminal defendants to examine
20 Bayer, supra note 9, at 395 (emphasis added) (quoting McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763-64 (2010)).
21 id.
22 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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witnesses and tender physical evidence in their own defense. It
hardly requires deep analysis to prove that vouchsafing criminal
defendants' right of confrontation while denying them the
comparably pivotal right to present their own affirmative evidence
would arbitrarily and capriciously prevent criminal defendants
from preparing their respective defenses. Therefore, although
nowhere stated within its text, the unsurprising rule is that such a
right is inherent in the meaning of the Due Process Clauses.2 3
As these examples demonstrate, the second Justice John
Marshall Harlan accurately recognized that as "selective
incorporation" coupled with the doctrine of unenumerated rights
prove, "due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an
independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness, more
general and inclusive than the specific prohibitions" in the Bill of
Rights.2 4 Accordingly, "due process of law" is the Constitution's
singular defining concept-indeed, it is the Constitution's value
monism-for, all other fundamental constitutional rights, express
or implied, radiate therefrom. Consequently, over a century ago,
the Supreme Court rightly expressed the rudimentary nature of due
process when it said, "The fundamental guaranty of due process is
absolute and not merely relative. . . . [T]he constitutional safeguard
23 See, e.g., Bedoya v. Couglin, 91 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, (1974) ("An inmate has a due process right to
summon witnesses in his defense at a prison disciplinary hearing, provided
facility officials do not determine that this would in any way threaten
institutional safety or correctional goals."). For an equally compelling and more
historically prominent example, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(invalidating racial segregation under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating racial
segregation under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause). The
most pertinent constitutional provision to proscribe racial discrimination
mandated under state law arguably is the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, as the Brown court aptly understood. However, that
Amendment does not constrain the exercise of federal power. Thus, to
invalidate mandatory racial segregation of public schools in the District of
Columbia and other federal jurisdictions, the Court relied on the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as embracing the principles of equal protection
of the law. As the Bolling court declared, in perhaps understated tones, due
process of law and equal protection are "not mutually exclusive." Bolling, 347
U.S. at 499.
24 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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as to due process [is] at all times dominant and controlling where
the Constitution is applicable."2 5
B. The Legal Meaning of "Due Process of Law"
1. The Due Process Clauses prohibit governmental conduct that
is either "arbitrary or capricious"
The next step, then, is determining what "due process of
law" actually entails. Expressing the essence of liberty, the
Supreme Court confirmed at the turn of the present century that
substantive and procedural due process proscribes government
from "abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression,"26 a proposition eagerly respected by the lower
courts. The Supreme Court's 1998 Lewis opinion pr6cised that
standard using an accustomed legal term: "Since the time of our
early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of
the concept to be protection against arbitrary action . . . We have
emphasized time and again that '[t]he touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government"'28 Lewis continues the Court's two-centuries-old
tradition that, "[A]fter volumes spoken and written with a view to
their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at [last] settled
down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained
by the established principles of private right and distributive
justice."29
25 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350 (1909); see also
United States v. Smith, 480 F.2d 664, 668 n.9 (5th Cir. 1973).
26 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)).
27 E.g., Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir. 2015); Hatfield v. O'Neill, 534
Fed. Appx. 838, 844 (11th Cir. 2013); Raab v. Blakey, 370 Fed. Appx. 303, 309
(3rd Cir. 2010).
28 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
29 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819) (emphasis added). The
Court's conclusion in Okely has been reaffirmed and remains good law as of this
writing. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-46 (quoting Okely for the proposition that,
"Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have understood the
core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary action.").
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Surely there can be no greater protection from official
misconduct because those all-encompassing categories-
"arbitrary and capricious abuses"-apparently include every
possible governmental malfeasance. The next question, then, is:
what comprises "arbitrary and capricious abuses"?
2. Governmental action is "arbitrary or capricious" if it is
immoral, that is, lacking "fundamental fairness"
Importantly and unsurprisingly, determining whether a
challenged governmental action is arbitrary or capricious, in fact,
constitutes a moral judgment. This point cannot be overstated
because, given that "arbitrary or capricious" conduct is immoral
conduct, and given that the Constitution prohibits "arbitrary or
capricious" governmental conduct, the legal meaning of "due
process of law"-that is, the legal meaning of the constitutional
provision proscribing "arbitrary or capricious" behavior-is in fact
a moral determination. Simply put, the Constitution, through its
Due Process Clauses, has made morality-moral comportment-
not simply a part of the law, but rather the highest law.
Accordingly, to properly define and enforce "due process of law,"
judges must master moral theory; there simply is no other
expedient because discerning "arbitrary or capricious" conduct vel
non is a moral inquiry. 3 0
Thus, fully appreciating the Court's formal theoretical
expression of due process morality, Justice Felix Frankfurter
fittingly employed terms that demarcate morality-"fair and
right"-to boldly but accurately profess:
It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the
Due Process Clause[s] embod[y] a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply embedded in
the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as
conceived by our whole history. Due process is
30 In Bayer, supra note 10, at _ (forthcoming), I explain in detail that such was
understood by both the original Framers and the Reconstruction Congress, and
that judges are perfectly capable of performing such intricate analysis.
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that which comports with the deepest notions of
what is fair and right and just.31
Consistent with the foregoing, and despite some doctrinal
challenges, 3 2 the courts have rightly and consistently held that to
satisfy its moral duty under "due process of law," government
conduct need not be smart, nor efficient, nor wise, nor sound
policy. Rather, all acts and efforts of government must be
fundamentally fair 3-thus, neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor
31 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added), abrogated, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). While
no one better expressed the abstract concept of due process, review of
Frankfurter's discrete positions in due process cases evinces that nothing short
of the most hideous offenses to human dignity would fit his model. E.g., Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (police conduct that "shocks the
conscious" violates "due process of law"). Arguably, Frankfurter's expression
of due process theory was both profound and correct; but, his applications were
unduly miserly.
32 For example, as the Court opined shortly before the turn of the twentieth
century:
If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere
of legislative power, and their enforcement be attended with
the observance of those general rules which our system of
jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the
harshness, injustice, and oppressive character of such laws
will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. . . . It is hardly necessary to say
that the hardship, impolicy, or injustice of state laws is not
necessarily an objection to their constitutional validity; and
that the remedy for evils of that character is to be sought from
state legislatures.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520 (1885). More recently,
three justices irately and inaptly asserted, "a Justice's commission does not
confer any special moral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify
imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of 'due
process."' Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
33 E.g., Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of Durham County,, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25
(1981) (due process "expresses the requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a
requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty");
Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (quoting Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)) (citation and footnote omitted) ("Due process
cannot create or enlarge power.... It has to do, as taught by the Government's
own cases, with the denial of that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice."); accord U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973);
"In construing that Amendment, we have held that it imposes minimum
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otherwise inconsistent with "a principle of natural equity,
recognized by all temperate and civilized governments, from a
deep and universal sense of its justice." 34
3. The meaning of moral bearing-of comporting with
"fundamental fairness "-has been best expressed by the
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant
Given that defining "due process of law's" guarantee of
"fundamental fairness" is a moral enquiry, the next matter is
discerning the right moral standards to apply. Although subject to
varying definitions, this article urges that the best available moral
theory is popularly known as "Kantian ethics," meaning modem
treatment of the moral philosophy espoused by the noted
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant.3 5 While worthy of
fuller explication, 3 6 the following provides an acceptable if
rudimentary and rough overview.
The core concept Kant espoused is human dignity, an idea
that, as we will see, the judiciary has borrowed, albeit without
attribution to this singular pillar of moral philosophy. In particular,
Kant maintained that all human beings possess innate, unassailable
"dignity" derived from humankind's unique, likely divinely
standards of fairness on the States." Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269
(2008); see also, e.g., Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 117 (1934) (per
Cardozo, J.) ("Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair, but
fairness is a relative, not an absolute, concept. It is fairness with reference to
particular conditions or particular results."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
326 (1937) (per Cardozo, J.).
34 Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 238.
35 See Bayer, supra note 9, at 347-48 (explaining the difference between
"Kantian ethics" and "Kant's ethics."); Bayer supra note 10, at Section 1I.4.c
(forthcoming) (explaining Kantian morality's relationship to the Founders'
original intent).
36 As I noted earlier, inquiries into moral theory and the meaning of "due process
of law" are intricate, complex and demand highly sophisticated explication.
Such thoroughgoing explications, however, are not appropriate for this article.
If, as I hope, the reader is interested in the more complete demonstration of the
underlying propositions, I would be honored if she or he consult: Bayer, supra
note 9, at 346-403; Peter Brandon Bayer, The Individual Mandate's Due
Process Legality: A Kantian Explanation, and Why It Matters, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L. J. 865, 896-911 (2013); and particularly, Bayer, supra note 10, at _
(forthcoming), for substantially more complete elaborations of Kant's theory of
morality and dignity and its proper application to due process jurisprudence.
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endowed ability to recognize moral truth through neutral,
impartial reason.3 7 Because morality is immutable, transcendent
truth, the correct moral result can never come from, to use the
popular and inapt term, "striking a balance" to attain some
arguably best possible conclusion. Instead, as any given
dilemma's correct moral resolution is deduced from neutral,
unbiased reason, that resolution must be obeyed no matter how
distasteful or distressing. Thus, morality, to use the common
phrasing, is not based on attaining a "good" outcome, but rather on
attaining the "right" outcome. Morality is a harsh, unforgiving,
and uncompassionate taskmaster, for morality demands doing what
is right no matter the cost. In that regard, Kant was neither
hyperbolic nor incorrect in his notorious assertion, "Let justice be
done even if the world should perish." 3 8
Of course, persons are imperfect; therefore, their searches
for moral truth and their capacities to reason are imperfect.
However, human dignity derives from the capacity, not the
actuality, of achieving morally correct judgment.39 Moreover and
of utmost importance:
Because human dignity arises from the facility to be
moral, rather than actual moral comportment itself,
persons are entitled to respect, meaning they must
be treated in ways that do not compromise their
intrinsic dignity regardless of how they actually
behave. Accordingly, every individual has an
affirmative, immutable duty to treat all others in a
37 Kant was a deontologist. That is, he believed that moral principles are
immutable (never changing), a priori (thus preceding the coming of
humankind), and applicable to all societies and cultures regardless of particular
practices, histories, and traditions therein. Consequently, morality is not a
human construct, but rather, the product of reason. E.g., Bayer, supra note 10,
at _ (forthcoming); Bayer, supra, note 9, at 293-221 (defining terms and
explaining why Deontology rather than Utilitarianism (also known as
Consequentialism) correctly explicates morality).
3 IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON
POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 102 n.16 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L.
Colclasure trans., 2006).
39 See Bayer, supra note 9, at 348-53.
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dignified fashion plus a corresponding immutable
right to be so treated by all others.4 0
The question becomes, of course, how does one person
respect the dignity of another? In answer, Kant famously
presented critical principles he called "categorical imperatives" of
which this writing will discuss two. The first ("Cli") holds, "Act
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law." 41 It is not too much of an
over-simplification to state that Kant's first Categorical Imperative
echoes the "Golden Rule"; that is, your behavior towards others
should reflect principles applicable to any and all similarly situated
others. Thus, you employ a standard-a law-that is universal.
"Accordingly, if in response to Smith's action 1, Jones takes
[action 2], then equally Smith, or any person, should be able to
take action 2 if Jones, or any similarly situated person, performs
[action 1].'12
Although the first categorical imperative eliminates
hypocrisy, it cannot constitute a complete moral system because
Cli cannot prove that any given "maxim" is a moral "universal
law." 4 3 In other words, the particular espoused maxim may be
universal, but universality alone cannot guarantee that the maxim
demands right behavior rather than wrong behavior. Accordingly,
more is required; and, indeed, the very core of Kantian morality is
found in the celebrated second categorical imperative ("CI2").
"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end." 4 4  Thus, the
foregoing, perhaps arcane quote aptly counsels that it cannot be
per se immoral to treat persons as "means." "Indeed, human
40 Peter Brandon Bayer, Debunking Unequal Burdens, Trivial Violations,
Harmless Stereotypes, and Similar Judicial Myths: The Convergence of Title VII
Literalism, Congressional Intent, and Kantian Dignity Theory, 89 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 401, 483-84 (symposium issue; citing Bayer, supra note 9, at 353-58).
41 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 88
(Harper Torchbooks ed., H.J. Paton trans., 1964).
42 Bayer, supra note 40, at 484. "For example, if Smith hits Jones because Jones
insulted Smith, then Smith can have no moral objections if Jones hits Smith
should Smith comparably insult Jones." Id. at 484 n.276.
43 Id. at 484.
4 KANT supra, note 41, at 96.
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exchanges are predicated on individuals and groups giving and
receiving benefits. Rather, persons cannot treat others 'simply'-
only-as 'means."' 45  That is, individuals-persons, groups,
organizations, corporations, even nations-may use other
individuals as means to attain desired ends, but only in ways that
respect the dignity of those others with whom they interact by
treating them an "end[s]" in themselves. 4 6  "As Professor Kutz
compellingly [invoked], '[Using] a person [solely] [for another's
gain] does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that
he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."' 4 7
Possibly the best analogy is that, when interacting with
others, we respect such others' innate and incomparable dignity-
treat them as ends in themselves-by not objectifying them. We
do not transform them into inanimate objects, devoid of feelings,
of personhood, and of humanity, existing only for the given user's
pleasure.4 8 Classic examples of treating others "merely as means,"
not as "ends in themselves," include eliciting behavior either by
lying or through duress. Regarding the former, the other party
cannot make reasoned responses and decisions because she does
not actually know the true state of affairs. Regarding the latter, the
other party is not merely being pressured, but is being threatened
and thus cannot make a truly free choice among possible options.
The entire function of morality, then, is to assure that every
individual respects the dignity of every other individual.
Thus, relevant herein as it anticipates how Kantian ethics
inform executive clemency, the otherwise extremely perceptive
Professor Harold Krent mistakenly argues that:
Irrespective of the individual's capacity to make a
reasoned choice, we might limit conditional pardons
45 Bayer, supra note 40, at 485.
46 Bayer, supra note 10, at _ (forthcoming); Bayer, supra note 36, at 900-03;
Bayer, supra note 9, at 354-55.
47 Bayer, supra note 9, at 355-56 (quoting Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity
and Existential Politics, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 256 (2007)) (quoting ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 33 (1977) (alterations in original)).
Importantly, Kant included as a corollary to CI2 the "duty of rightful honor,"
which mandates that an individual has no more right to treat herself merely as a
means than she has to treat others merely as means. This writing extrapolates on
the duty of rightful honor later on as it becomes integral to assessing the
constitutionality of self-pardons.
48 See id. at 354-58.
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because imposition of certain conditions adversely
may affect society as a whole. . . . Arguably, the
rights of free speech, religious practice, and bodily
autonomy are so fundamental to what we as a
society deem civilized that permitting waivers may
erode the fabric of society. As Kant and others
have argued, certain rights should be inalienable.
Society may suffer if the state can take away certain
core rights even if the offender is willing to accept
the price. Allowing a market in such rights
denigrates their importance and constitutive role in
reaffirming citizenship. 4 9
Perhaps ironically and counter-intuitively, that "[s]ociety
may suffer" is not pivotal to applicable Kantian moral theory. In
Kantian theory, society is not an end in itself, but rather a means,
albeit an essential and required means, to respect the innate dignity
of individual persons. Persons do not work for society; rather
society works for them.50  Accordingly, constitutional and other
legal standards protect individuals; thus, the reason "[s]ociety may
suffer" is that the individuals comprising that society suffer if due
process is violated. Societal-wide obligation to comply with moral
precepts codified as law, then, safeguards the exercise of
individual human dignity. That is why no person may be
compelled to sacrifice her dignity for the sake of others, even for
society itself because the entire purpose of society is respecting
every individuals' dignity, at all times, in all places, under all
situations. Such, then, is this perhaps too brief but functional
synopsis of Kantian morality.
4. Discerning rights under the Due Process Clauses is an
exercise in deontological moral reasoning
Fascinatingly, but not surprisingly, given that "due process
of law" is an exercise in realizing whether challenged
49 Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President's Conditional Pardon Power, 89
CAL. L. REv. 1665, 1692 (2001) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
5o See Bayer, supra note 36, at 903-07 (discussing Kant's argument that forming
a social order through which to commemorate as law principles of moral
comportment regulating individual interactions such as contractual and property
transactions, is a moral imperative).
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governmental behavior does or does not comport with
"fundamental fairness," the federal courts have embraced, but only
partially, their duty to be experts in the gist and application of
moral theory. Specifically, although it seems to violate the very
structure of legal meaning, the Supreme Court enforces two
incompatible yet extant paradigms to resolve due process issues.
We may call them the deeply rooted liberty principles standard and
the dignity paradigm. The deeply rooted liberty principles
standard is encapsulated, albeit arguably out of context, from the
noted American jurisprude Justice Benjamin Cardozo's entreaty
that due process protects rights, "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."5
Three-quarters of a century later, the Supreme Court purported to
promote the deeply rooted liberty principles standard as the
definitive meaning of due process. 5 2
The fundamental infirmity of the deeply rooted liberty
principles approach is self-evident: it is an empirical measure.
That is, it seeks to discern through historical and other empirical
research what the American population, or some designated sub-
section thereof, believes to be principles expressing basic national
values. To the fullest extent possible, proponents of that paradigm
make no judgments regarding whether the discerned principles,
albeit "deeply rooted," in fact are moral and thus worthy of respect
and compliance. Instead, the courts uncritically apply those
"principles" regardless of the outcome, thereby rendering
"fundamental fairness" into a massive tautology: the "deeply
rooted principles" at issue are fair because they are "deeply
rooted." 5 3 Alternatively, courts disingenuously may substitute for
an unsuitable set of "deeply rooted principles" another suddenly
discovered set that better comports with what the reviewing court
believes should be the applicable "deeply rooted principles."5 4
' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
52 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760; see, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997). I argue elsewhere that the McDonald Court's attempted
rationale is logically and historically infirm. Bayer, supra note 10, at
(forthcoming).
1 Bayer, supra note 10, at Section 5(e)(4) (forthcoming).
54 In such instances, while purporting to apply the deeply rooted principles
approach, the courts, of course, are really substituting their best moral judgments
in the guise of a newly discovered, newly emerging array of "deeply rooted
principles."
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Arguably recognizing the inadequacy of the deeply rooted
liberties standard, the Supreme Court has devised the dignity
paradigm, an alternative that properly fulfills "due process of
law's" moral imperative by employing Kantian morality, although
the Court has yet to acknowledge even in a cursory footnote its
debt to that philosopher's mammoth oeuvre. Pursuant to the
dignity paradigm, because the Due Process Clauses prohibit
official behavior that offends "fundamental fairness," courts must
overturn statutes, regulations, procedures, and such other
governmental actions that offend individual "dignity." Fittingly,
then, "dignity" is the pivotal concept delimiting the meaning and
applications of "due process of law."
Astutely appreciating that "it is the Kantian vision of
dignity that seemingly animates" the Court," Professor Rex
Glensey rightly avers that the dignity paradigm is, "steady,
although inconsistent and haphazard, so that there is a partially
developed body of American constitutional law that deals with
some semblance of the right to dignity."5 6 Of course, while few if
any standards are so fully developed that their meanings and
applications are clear beyond reasonable dispute, one might
properly concede that among competing constitutional exemplars,
the dignity paradigm is particularly underdeveloped. Still, even
allowing that dignity's "importance, meaning, and function are
commonly presupposed but rarely articulated," 5 7 and, despite
frustration with Supreme Court's seeming aversion to clarifying its
standard, 8 the perceptive investigator may easily discern that
which is not really hidden with the dignity paradigm-Kant's Cli
and particularly C2-to determine whether, in any given instance,
11 Rex D. Glensey, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 65, 86
(2011).
56 Id.; see, e.g., Neomi Rao, Three Concepts ofDignity in Constitutional Law, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183, 202 (2011) (courts rarely consider the inherent
nature of human dignity, focusing instead (as though the two were unrelated) on
"what types of rights, freedoms, or entitlements may flow from 'dignity' as a
legal concept.").
5 Leslie M. Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 172
(2011).
5 "It is not that the right to dignity has to be shapeless by its very nature, and
thus is subject to inconsistent use, but rather, that so far there has been no
coalescence (particularly in the United States) around the rational possibilities
that exist for a coherent legal theory of human dignity." Glensey, supra note 55,
at 107-08; see, e.g., Rao, supra note 56, at 202-03.
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government violates "due process of law" by treating regulated
individuals and groups merely as means for some governmental
end without concomitantly regarding such individuals and groups
as ends in themselves. In fact, the revered American jurist and
legal theorist Benjamin Cardozo "may have been correct to say:
'Our jurisprudence has held fast to Kant's categorical imperative . .
. . We look beyond the particular to the universal, and shape our
judgment in obedience to the fundamental interest of society that
contracts shall be fulfilled."'5 9
The most precise expression of the due process dignity
paradigm was reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court: due
process liberty-the moral philosophy of fundamental fairness-
prohibits governmental actions that evince, "a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group." 60 "A bare desire to
harm" clearly implicates Kantian morality, particularly CI2 because
indulging such a desire renders the maltreated persons merely
means to assuage the perpetrators' malicious motives.
The "bare desire to harm" principle evokes several
interesting and important corollaries. First, even if the relevant
purpose or goal is fully legitimate, Government cannot effectuate
that goal through devices that treat affected individuals merely as
means and not as ends in themselves. For example, certainly
government can enact programs to help indigent individuals and
families buy food. In so doing, for any number of valid reasons,
government may design and implement such programs in ways
that may alleviate-but do not completely abrogate-the problem
5 Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the Common
Good, 91 TEX. L. REv. 1609, 1615 (2013) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139-40 (1921)). Identically, Professor
Wright astutely observed that while courts rarely quote, much less cite, either
"Kant [or] any other philosopher[,] [ p]opular versions of philosophical accounts
of dignity are an element of the jurisprudential air we breathe. Inevitably,
philosophical accounts inform our constitutional case law on the meanings,
sources, and roles of dignity." R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of
Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 527, 537-38 (2006) (footnote omitted).
60 U.S. v. Windsor, 540 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (citing Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534-535 (1973)); see also, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634-35 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47
(1985).
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of malnutrition among the poor.61  However, "Although a State
may adopt a[n] [imperfect welfare program] . . . it may not, of
course, impose a regime of invidious discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 62
Turning to a second vital corollary consistent with if not
actually emanating from the first, the shorthand "bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group" does not connote that the
"desire to harm" was government's sole, overarching, or dominant
motivation. Rather, "bare" means a naked, plain, or revealed
"desire to harm." Accordingly, that some legitimate motives might
accompany the "bare desire to harm" will not salvage the
challenged governmental action unless, of course, that action in
fact treats the regulated individuals as ends in themselves. 6 3
61 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (Maryland's
"upper limit" on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) payments
based on family size is a rational, thus constitutional means of "allocating
available public funds in such a way as fully to meet the needs of the largest
possible number of families" even though the system "results in some disparity
in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families."); Tuan Anh
Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 78 (2001) (legislative classifications may be
"imperfect") (quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (same).
62 Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 483. Thus, for instance, Government could not limit
or experiment with welfare programs by aiding only indigent white families.
Disallowing otherwise eligible minority families treats them not as ends in
themselves (in which case they too would receive the relevant governmental
largesse), but rather merely as means to promote racial bigotry by depriving
them of an otherwise morally enforced governmental benefit that white persons
receive.
63 For example, in United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973), the Supreme Court, applying the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, struck 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 that reduced
eligibility solely to "households" where all residents are familiarly related. Id. at
538. Via the 1971 amendments, Congress intended to prohibit "hippie
communes" from receiving food stamps, because although lawful, legislators
disapproved of the hippy lifestyle. Id. at 534. The Supreme Court declared the
1971 amendments unconstitutional because they were enacted to, and indeed
did, cause undeserved harm to "hippies" who had done nothing immoral to
deserve such treatment. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537-38. Moreno easily fits the
Kantian analysis proposed in this article because Congress treated hippies and
their communes not as ends in themselves but merely as means to satisfy
Congress' vindictive and otherwise immoral animus against them. Among
legitimate purposes, the amendments reduced the government's expenditures for
food stamps, thus saving taxpayer dollars. Certainly, reducing costs is a
legitimate governmental goal; however, that laudable goal did not save the Food
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Addressing a third corollary likewise of great importance, although
its text arguably implies affirmative intent, the "bare desire to
harm" standard may be understood to also cover unintentional and
inadvertent failures by government to treat individuals and groups
as ends in themselves. After all, the moral question always is
whether given conduct is or is not moral, not whether the alleged
offender intended to act immorally, although certainly that latter
inquiry may be very informative.6
With these standards firmly in mind, arguably the most
notable application of the dignity paradigm's "bare desire to harm"
principle arises from the Court's "homosexual rights" decisions.
In the first instance, Romer v. Evans invalidated a referendum
amending the Colorado Constitution to mandate that any future
legal protection of homosexual individuals as a class must be
enacted exclusively through a state constitutional amendment, and
repealed all statutes, ordinances, and state precedents specifically
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." 65 The
Romer Court reasoned those classes were not singled out for
adverse treatment due to any true danger they posed to others.
Rather, the amendment unconstitutionally promoted the untoward
bigotry of those who consider homosexuality and related statuses
offensive, abnormal or depraved.6 6 Not surprisingly, Romer
predicated its ruling on the constitutional premise that, "'a bare ...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."' 6 7
Seven years later, reversing its earlier opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick,68 the Court ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that government
may not per se criminalize homosexual sodomy performed in
private between consenting adults. 6 9 Sensibly accenting dignity,
Stamp Act amendments because the means employed were designed to promote
immoral, thus unconstitutional, purposes.
' See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974) (invalidating under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause that portion of New York
state's elections statute that unintentionally disqualified some but not all
incarcerated persons from obtaining absentee ballots).
65 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
16 See id. at 635-36.
67 Id. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
68478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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the Lawrence Court ruled that "[ilt suffices for us to acknowledge
that adults may choose to enter upon [an intimate personal]
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."70 A decade
after Lawrence, the Court in U.S. v. Windsor7 1 struck as violative
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause section 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which banned the federal
government from officially recognizing same-sex marriages
lawfully performed in states then permitting such nuptials. 7 2
Building on the foregoing, two years later, the Court ruled in
Obergefell v. Hodges that state laws prohibiting same-sex civil
marriages on terms equal with opposite-sex marriages contravene
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.73
As it must, the core legal rationale for both Obergefell and
Windsor holds that pursuant to the Constitution's guarantee of
"due process of law," all acts and edicts of every office, agent, or
level of American government must be morally sound.
Specifically, together, the Obergefell- Windsor rationale reasons
that discrimination against same-sex marriages unjustifiably
offends the innate human dignity of individuals who wish to
engage in same-sex civil marriages. Reaffirming that due process
exists to protect and preserve dignity, 7 4 and accenting that the
70 Id. at 567 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, like its empirical findings in
Romer, Lawrence emphasized that Texas had failed to prove that treating
homosexual intimacy equally with heterosexual intimacy would cause any
actual societal harm other than offending the sensibilities of bigoted individuals
who disapprove of homosexuals and homosexuality. In that regard, the Court
unequivocally stated: "The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime." Id. at 578.
71 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
72 Windsor, 540 U.S. at 769-70. Section 3 of DOMA amended The Dictionary
Act to read, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Windsor, 540 U.S. at
752 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
n Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015). Concurrently and
logically, Obergefell overturned state statutes barring official recognition of
same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other jurisdictions. Id. at 2607-08.
74 "In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to
individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs." Id. at 2597 (citations omitted).
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institution of marriage is a most profound expression of such
dignity, the Court unsurprisingly concluded that, pursuant to their
individual and combined dignity, persons comprising same-sex
couples are entitled to the benefits of marriage equally with
opposite-sex couples. 7 6 Integral to that proposition, of course, is
the Court's reiteration that homosexuality qua homosexuality
poses no untoward societal harms justifying discriminating against
otherwise legally eligible same-sex couples who wish to marry. 7 7
Obergefell rightly concluded that because same-sex
marriage is not immoral, government must treat such marriages as
it would opposite-sex marriage. Accordingly, based on the
Kantian morality implicit in the Court's dignity paradigm,
governmental discrimination against same-sex marriages treats the
couples seeking to marry and their offspring not as ends in
themselves-human beings whose innate dignity makes them
worthy of respect-but rather merely as means to perpetrate
unjustified bigotry.
We now understand, not merely as an aspiration but as
America's highest law, the Constitution mandates moral
comportment by all governmental offices and actors, at all times,
in all circumstances. Moreover, according to the judiciary, and
7 "There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices." Id. at 2599
(citation omitted). Indeed, "[a] first premise of the Court's relevant precedents
is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept
of individual autonomy[, denoting an] abiding connection between marriage and
liberty." Id. Along these lines, Obergefell accented that, "the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals." Id. Identically, Windsor accented
that marriage is society's imprimatur permitting couples, through the
solemnization of official ceremony "to define themselves by their commitment
to each other." Windsor, 540 U.S. at 763.
76 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
n Id. at 2596. Of equal magnitude, bans and lesser discriminatory disadvantages
imposed on same-sex marriages disparage the human dignity of children raised
by same-sex couples who wish to marry or whose marriages are treated by
governmental offices differently-inevitably as less worthy, thereby less
protected-from opposite-sex marriages. Denouncing such disparate treatment,
the Court explained, "[a]s all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide
loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted.
And hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised by such
couples.... This provides powerful confirmation ... that gays and lesbians can
create loving, supportive families." Id. at 2600.
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consistent with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant but not so
attributed, moral comportment requires that government treat all
under its jurisdiction with "fundamental fairness," meaning
treating all persons as ends in themselves, not merely as means.
With the foregoing as our due process basis, this writing now turns
to the applicable law of clemency and its comportment with the
Constitution's Due Process Clauses.
III. THE NATURE OF THE CLEMENCY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. Clemency and Pardons in General
Given the subject matter of this writing, it is prudent to
describe clemency under the Constitution before determining
whether it is constrained by the Due Process Clauses and, if so,
exactly how so:
The term "clemency" is a comprehensive term that
has come to be used for all types of relief available
pursuant to the pardon power, to avoid confusion
with the narrower technical use of the term
"pardon" in the Justice Department's clemency
regulations which denotes the limited grant of relief
after completion of sentence. Clemency includes
commutation of sentence, reprieve, and remission of
fine, as well as full or unconditional pardon. 78
Although commonly issued for the benefit of one or a small
number of individuals, the law recognizes class-wide clemency
commonly known as "amnesty," 79 which, of necessity, often
covers classes of unnamed individuals rather than denoting each
7 Love, supra note 1, at 1484 n.4 (citation omitted). Similarly, Professor Kobil
explained the constituency of clemency, "[w]ithin the broad ambit of 'clemency'
are five specific varieties of leniency commonly recognized under American
law: pardon, amnesty, commutation, remission of fines, and reprieve." Daniel
T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power from
the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 575 (1991).
79 "The term 'amnesty' is usually used where a grant of clemency is extended by
proclamation to a class of individuals." Love, supra note 1, at 1484 n.4.
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benefitted person specifically.80 Thus, acts of clemency need not
identify every or indeed any given beneficiary by either name or
other individualized index of identity other than belonging to the
benefitted class.
Addressing the federal level, our Constitution employs the
term "reprieves" to denote clemency in general. Consistent with
tradition, clemency-"reprieves "-rests with the Executive
Branch, as clarified by the Constitution's Article II, Section 2,
which declares in relevant part that the President enjoys the
"[p]ower to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."8 1 The President's
grant of a pardon is "an executive action that mitigates or sets aside
punishment for a crime."82
Given the depth and complexity of the numerous clemency
petitions brought to their attention, modem Presidents and
governors have relied on formal offices to help them determine
which pleas to grant and what exact form such grants should
take. 8 3 In particular regarding assistance to the President:
The pardon attorney in the U.S. Department of
Justice receives and investigates all applications for
pardon and commutation of sentence and makes a
recommendation for or against pardon in each case.
Review is on a paper record, and no hearing is held.
Meritorious pardon cases are referred to the FBI for
a background investigation and to the United States
so To cite just a few significant instances as examples, "[i]n 1795, President
Washington granted an unconditional pardon to many of the participants in the
Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion. John Adams, in order to serve 'the public
good,' likewise issued a presidential pardon to all persons involved in an
insurrection in Pennsylvania." Kobil, supra note 78, at 592 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, "President Lincoln's offer of amnesty to Southern secessionists on the
condition that they take a loyalty oath." Krent, supra note 49, at 1668.
81 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
82 Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1113 (6th ed. 1990).
83 For example, "[i]n 1893, President [Grover] Cleveland issued an executive
order authorizing the Attorney General to assume full responsibility for
administering the pardon power and making him the President's principal
advisor in clemency matters. Executive Order of June 16, 1893." RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 1 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 7.5(a) n.7 (2017).
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Attorney and sentencing judge for a
recommendation. Recommendations are referred to
the White House through the deputy attorney
general. The president decides all cases, including
ones in which pardon is denied.84
While the actual deliberative process may be lengthy and
multifaceted, "[t]he president is not required to report the reasons
for pardon decisions, and there is no appeal from a denial of relief.
. . . The clemency process is conducted in utmost secrecy, and
applicants themselves are not entitled to know everything that is in
their clemency files."85
B. English Antecedents to Modern American Clemency
Consistent with much of American law and legal tradition,
the derivation of Article II, Section 2, including the express textual
limitation against use of clemency to impede impeachments, traces
back to British standards. 8 6 "By the time of Henry VII's reign in
England, the common law had developed the principle that the
monarch was vested, absolutely and exclusively, with the power to
pardon those accused or convicted of crime." 87 Likewise, Harold
Krent explained:
By the middle of the sixteenth century, the
prerogative of the pardon power became centralized
in the King, and the royal power to pardon covered
the "authority to pardon or remit any treasons,
murders, manslaughters or any kinds of felonies ...
or any outlawries for any such offenses . . .
committed ... by or against any person or persons .
* MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 7:14 (2016) (footnote
omitted).
81 Id. (citing Binion v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that the Justice Department was not required to release
confidential information compiled by the FBI for pardon investigation).
86 See Kobil, supra note 78, at 589 ("By choosing to repose the clemency power
in the chief executive alone, the Framers of the Constitution aligned themselves
with a vision of the power that was decidedly British in nature.").
8 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, at § 7.5(a) (footnote omitted).
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. . of this Realm." The King enjoyed the flexibility
to use pardons for any purpose advantageous to his
goals. The pardon power remained open-ended
until Parliament constrained the King's power in the
1700 Act of Settlement, thereby precluding the
King's exercise of the pardon power to frustrate
impeachments.8 8
Not surprising as it is consistent with the power and
prerogatives of a monarch, both of England's preeminent
jurisprudes, Lord Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone,
concurred that "the English King was given great discretion and
leeway in the exercise of his power; his pardon could be 'either
absolute, or under condition, exception, or qualification."' 89
One might suppose that the vesting of such power stemmed
from the much over-stated premise that "[t]he King can do no
wrong" and, thus, may grant clemency at his whim.90 However, as
the quotations above emphasize, in a nuance that was adapted by
the American Constitution's Framers, the monarch's authority was
circumscribed in 1700 by the "Act of Settlement, thereby
precluding the King's exercise of the pardon power to frustrate
impeachments." 91 Such was the state of English clemency theory
when the Framers of the Constitution took up the issue regarding
Krent, supra note 49, at 1671 (quoting Act for Continuing Certain Liberties of
the Crown 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 24, § 1 (Eng.) (other footnotes omitted).
89 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, at § 7.5(a) (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE,
THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233 (1817). In
his famous treatise, Blackstone explained that "the king may extend his mercy
upon what terms he pleases; and may annex to his bounty a condition either
precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof the validity of the pardon
will depend." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *394).
* Cf Haugen v. Kitzhaber, 306 P.3d 592, 602 (Or. 2013) (footnote omitted)
("Despite ... limitations on the king's power, for a period of time in England,
the king's power to pardon was absolute.")
9 Krent, supra note 49, at 1671. Professor Krent cites Patrick R. Cowlishaw,
The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REv. 149, 157 (1975), to
explicate that aspect of constrained monarchial power: "Under British practice,
parliamentary impeachments included conventional punishment, and thus a
royal pardon would directly impinge upon parliamentary prerogatives. In
addition, monarchs did not have to take an oath to promise to govern according
to the laws of Parliament until after the Glorious Revolution of 1688." Krent,
supra note 49, at 1671 n.30.
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what authority in that realm, if any, should be accorded the
American President.
C. The American Model
Notwithstanding centuries of English practice to inform it,
and despite the technical legal standards summarized next,
commentators contend that, "[f]ew provisions in the Constitution
are as misunderstood and underestimated as the President's power
to pardon."9 2 Among the copious complex and intricate aspects of
American law, it might be said that the legal meaning of the
executive's authority to issue clemency remains underdeveloped,
almost in early adolescence as compared with the now centuries-
old sophistication of concepts such as separation of powers,
commerce, search and seizure, and due process of law.
Indicatively, Alexander Hamilton referred to the "benign
prerogative of pardoning,"93 implying there is little practical threat
to the Republic by vesting the power to nullify the work of the
judiciary in the criminal context in a single decision-maker, the
President. Certainly, the Framers did not expect a President to
attempt appropriating federal criminal law and policy through acts
of clemency such as the wholesale pardoning of large classes of
criminals; and to date, none have. Rather, the power to pardon and
dispense other acts of clemency, even class-wide amnesties, is to
be and has been used sparingly, if seemingly unsystematically, 9 4 to
promote such objectives as the given executive deems important.
Turning to the drafting of Article II, Section 2 itself,
interestingly, "[t]he idea of executive pardoning power was so
firmly established in the common law that delegates to the
Constitutional Convention adopted with little debate a clause
perpetuating the power of executive pardon for the President." 95
Still, the Framers understandably gave the clemency aspect
thoughtful consideration, imprinting on that doctrine the newness
92 Love, supra note 1, at 1483.
93 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clint Rossiter ed.,
1961).
94 See generally Jerry Carannante, What to do About the Executive Clemency
Power in The Wake of the Clinton Presidency, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 325
(2003).
9 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, at §7.5(a) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 626 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
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and boldness of the incipient nation. They arguably discarded both
the British concept that clemency authority exists in great measure
to enhance the legitimacy of the monarch or executive, 9 6 and many
of the limitations on executive discretion found in British practice
or theory constraining the monarch's will. 9 7 As Professor Krent
explained: "Despite Blackstone's views, the Constitution restored
the executive's pardon power to much of its earlier breadth.
Efforts to condition the President's pardon power on Senate
consent, for instance, were defeated. According to [James]
Madison's notes, [Constitutional Convention delegate] George
Mason commented that '[t]he Senate ha[d] already too much
power.' The President therefore retained the exclusive power of
pardons." 98 Similarly:
In a pamphlet, future Supreme Court Justice James
Tredell answered concerns about the unilateral and
unqualified clemency power giving the president
the ability to shield himself and/or accomplices
from their misdeeds. Iredell recognized this threat,
but at the same time recognized the threat of
imposing a change on the power as it stood. It
would be impossible to foresee the negative
implications of the change. Iredell saw the broad,
unilateral and unqualified nature of the clemency
power as being a great advantage since the president
could act with a "[great] degree of secrecy and
dispatch ... on critical occasions." 99
96 "[T]he king's use of the clemency power to enhance justice was apparently
not an end in itself. Rather, the purpose of these 'repeated acts of goodness' was
to consolidate the monarch's power: Blackstone observed that acts of clemency
'endear the sovereign to his subjects, and contribute more than any thing to root
in their hearts that filial affection, and personal loyalty, which are the sure
establishment of a prince."' Kobil, supra note 78, at 586 (quoting BLACKSTONE
supra note 89, at 398).
9 Id. at 596 ("[T]he English Parliament eventually did impose limits on the
pardoning power.").
98 Krent, supra note 49, at 1672-73 (quoting JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 735 (E.H. Scott ed., 1893) (recording discussion and
rejection of amendment to empower Senate to approve of pardons)).
99 Carannante, supra note 9494, at 344 (quoting JOHN IREDELL, ANSWER TO
MASON'S OBJECTION (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 352 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888)).
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In sum, as the Supreme Court famously expressed a
century-and-a-half ago, consistent with the breadth implied from
the text of Article II, Section 2, the President's authority "extends
to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any
time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken
or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment." 00 A
full pardon erases the act and its legal consequences so that "in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense" and restores the offender to "all his civil
rights."' 0 '
Equally, Professor Krent explicated regarding the text of
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1: "The Clause only restricts the
president's pardon power in three respects: acts to be pardoned
must constitute offenses against the United States, no impeachment
may be involved, and the offense already must have been
committed." 0 2  In fact, "the president may . . . grant broad
amnesty to a group of offenders ... and [even] grant pardons prior
to conviction."' 0 3  For example, the President may pardon or
otherwise grant modes of clemency regarding, inter alia, criminal
contempt (but not civil contempt, as Article 1I, Section 2 is limited
to criminal matters),1 0 4 and may, among other acts, remit fines and
forfeitures' 0 5 and commute sentences.' 0 6 Indeed, "[clase law has
now extended the power to pardon far beyond that recognized at
common law."1 0 7
"o Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4. Wall) 333, 334 (1866).
01 Id. at 380.
102 Krent, supra note 49, at 1673 (footnotes omitted).
103 Id.
i" See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121-22 (1925) (President may pardon
criminal but not civil contempt); 9B BARBARA VAN ARSDALE ET AL., 9B
FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 22:2123 (2017) ("the President
cannot pardon a private wrong or relieve the wrongdoer from civil liability to
the individual he has wronged."). It has also been argued that a presidential
pardon might not reach a contempt of Congress. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 414 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
'1 Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92 (1890); Krent, supra note 49, at
1673.
"o6 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486-88 (1927) (commutation of sentence
may be imposed without prisoner's consent); Armstrong v. United States, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1871).
107 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, at §7.5(a).
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Still, even discounting due process considerations, in
addition to the exclusion of clemency for impeachments,'0o Article
II, Section 2 is not without limits express and implied. Classically,
"The president has no authority to pardon offenses against the
states in light of our federalist system."' 09 Concurrently, "[a]
pardon cannot restore offices forfeited, or property or interest
vested in others as a consequence of a conviction and
judgment."' 10 As the Supreme Court ruled nearly 150-years-ago,
"However large ... may be the power of pardon possessed by the
President, and however extended may be its application, there is
this limit to it, as there is to all his powers-it cannot touch
moneys in the treasury of the United States, except expressly
authorized by act of Congress. The Constitution places this
restriction upon the pardoning power.""'
Correspondingly, as its nature implies, the discretion to
grant clemency does not entail a countervailing authority to impose
new, greater, or aggravated sanctions against the convicted
party.11 2 Nor may the President via clemency interfere with "the
108 Professor Krent explained:
The Article II exception for impeachment tracks British
precedent, preventing the president from nullifying
congressional removal of executive or judicial officials
through impeachment, even though, unlike in the British
system, the congressional impeachment power extends only to
removal from office. As Justice Story commented, "the
Constitution has . . . wisely interposed this check upon his
power, so that he cannot, by any corrupt coalition with
favourites, or dependents in high offices, screen them from
punishment."
Krent, supra note 49, at 1673 n.44 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1501 (5th ed. 1891)) (citation
omitted).
109 Id. at 1673 n.43 (citing Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 113 (1925); Carlesi
v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 59 (1914).
110 ARSDALE ET AL., supra note 104, at § 22:2123 (citing Garland, 71 U.S. at
334).
." Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) (pardon may not compensate
the offender for personal injuries suffered by imprisonment, nor vacate or
modify any rights that have vested in others due to the judgment against the
offender).
112 E.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
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vested rights of third parties."11 3 In addition, other offices at the
federal and state levels may impose sanctions or withhold largesse
even to those who have received full presidential pardons.
Notably, for example, official state and federal bar associations
may preserve the integrity of professional law practice by
disciplining members despite their receipt of full pardons for the
underlying offenses.11 4 Likewise, a respected treatise recounted
generally, "a government licensing agency may consider conduct
underlying a pardoned conviction where the conduct is relevant to
an individual's qualification for the license."11 5
As yet unresolved issues include whether the President's
Article II, Section 2 authority extends to pardoning violations of
international law, 1 6 although two noted scholars make the
compellingly logical case that:
The President should be able to pardon violations of
international law insofar as American courts,
whether state or federal, are concerned. However
(assuming that the situation should ever arise), an
international or foreign tribunal may decide not to
respect such a pardon because such tribunals are not
bound by United States law.11 7
Seemingly consistent with the logic of executive clemency,
a sitting President may require that the benefitted individual accept
conditions and limitations to receive a full pardon or lesser acts of
leniency. "From President Washington on, presidents have
attached conditions to many pardons and commutations. President
Lincoln's offer of amnesty to Southern secessionists on the
condition that they take a loyalty oath marks one controversial
example."" 8 The examples of varying types and intensities of
1" Kobil, supra note 78, at 600 (citing Knote, 95 U.S. at 154) (In Knote, "the
Court observed that a presidential pardon, like the king's pardon at common
law, may not affect the vested rights of third parties.").
I14 ROTUNDA& NOWAK, supra note 83, at §7.5(b) n.21.
" ARSDALE ET AL., supra note 104, at § 22:2131 (citing Hirschberg v.
Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n., 414 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2005)).
116 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, at §7.5(b) n.23.
117 Id.
118 Krent, supra note 49, at 1668 (footnotes omitted). Lincoln's amnesty was
conditioned on grantees affording no further help to the Confederate states.
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conditions are manifold."'9 It is equally unsurprising that courts
routinely uphold such conditional acts of clemency. "As the Court
observed in Ex parte Wells, the pardon power 'is frequently
conditional, as [the President] may extend his mercy upon what
terms he pleases, and annex to his bounty a condition precedent or
subsequent, on the performance of which the validity of the pardon
will depend."'l
2 0
In fact, a President may demand as a condition of clemency
acceptance of a punishment or a penalty that is not expressly
provided within the applicable federal criminal statute under which
the given felon was convicted. 1 2 1 As two scholars explained the
judiciary's reasoning, "[t]he majority opinion in Schick
emphasized that the only limits which can be imposed on the
presidential pardon power are those in the Constitution itself, and
to require the executive to substitute a punishment already
permitted by law would place unauthorized congressional
restrictions on the pardoning power."' 2 2  Of course as next
explained, Professors Rotunda and Nowak clarified (with upmost
importance for this writing) that while neither Congress nor the
judiciary exercising concepts of prudence may restrict the depth
and breadth of Article II, Section 2, the Constitution itself can and,
Conditions included a ban on traveling to the Southern states and a ban on
corresponding to anyone residing there in the absence of prior approval of a
military official. Id. at 1676 (footnotes omitted).
"19 "For instance, presidents have required, on pain of revocation of the pardon,
that offenders make restitution, drop financial claims against the government, or
accept deportation. Perhaps more surprisingly, presidents have required that
offenders not drink, not associate with undesirables, and provide their families
with greater financial support." Id. at 1668 (footnotes omitted). Professor Krent
expounded with further examples: "President Ford offered clemency to
numerous deserters after the Vietnam War on the condition that they perform
alternate service. . . . President Nixon pardoned James Hoffa on the condition
that Hoffa not engage in union politics. . . . President Madison pardoned certain
offenders as long as they agreed to join the Navy." Id. at 1676-77 (footnotes
omitted).
120 Id. at 1668-69 (quoting Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855))
(footnote omitted).
121 E.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 256 (upholding the presidential commutation of a
death sentence to life imprisonment conditioned on permanent ineligibility for
parole, even where the commuted sentence was not one which had been
specifically provided for by statute).




indeed, does so through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. It is to the due process limitation that this article now
turns.
D. The Due Process Meaning of Clemency
1. Clemency and suspicion of unfettered executive authority
Despite the seeming logic of according the President and
state executive offices, often the governor, exceptional discretion
to grant clemency, there remains a sense of unease. Specifically,
we as Americans cannot be comfortable with allowing one
governmental officer, even the highest-ranking executive,
unfettered discretion to circumvent the formal processes of
criminal law-particularly nullifying judicial review-whether for
the benefit of a single convicted felon, or especially for entire
classes.1 2 3 Indeed, in noteworthy contrast, at the state level in early
post-Revolution America, the power to grant pardons commonly
did not rest with the state executive. As Professor Kobil explained:
[T]he Revolution ushered in a period of distrust of
strong executive authority and temporarily brought
to an end the executive's clemency monopoly. By
the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787, most
state governments placed the power to remit
punishment for crimes in the legislative council and
the governor jointly, or in the legislature alone. The
pardoning power was exercised solely by the
governor only in New York, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.1 2 4
123 E.g., Carannante, supra note 94, at 344-45 (the Framers were aware of the
abuses of clemency by the English Crown).
124 Kobil, supra note 78, at 590 (footnotes omitted). Kobil therefore drew the
following historical conclusion:
[I]t was the British clemency model, not the model prevailing
in most states, that Alexander Hamilton was following when
he objected to the Virginia and New Jersey plans and
proposed that a supreme executive "have the power of
pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not
pardon without the approbation or rejection of the Senate."
Id. (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
95, at 292).
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Consistent with the anti-authoritarianism that, as noted
above, inspired the states generally to instigate a different
approach, the Constitution's adoption of the English clemency
model, while rejecting much of that system's restraints, seems an
uncomfortable anathema to that charter's overarching framework
which otherwise emphatically disdains enforcing law through
habitually un-reviewed actions of a unilateral arm of government,
herein the presidency. In the American paradigm, any act of
government that cannot be evaluated and checked by a different
office is by definition reminiscent of, if not indeed, an act of
tyranny. Even if the reviewed action is benevolent and provably
legitimate, the very fact that it is not subject to enforceable
constraint-that is, affirmation, modification, or nullification via
separation of powers-renders that act and its underlying authority
suspect as hostile to liberty. In that regard, there is some merit to
Professor Daniel Kobil's description that "[t]he clemency power is
something of a living fossil, a relic from the days when an all-
powerful monarch possessed the power to punish and to remit
punishment as an act of mercy."125
An associated arguable infirmity renders executive
clemency authority intrinsically suspicious even under the very
Constitution that permits it pursuant to Article II, Section 2.
Professor Kobil provides the point: "'Clemency,' as one deputy
pardoning attorney puts it, is after all 'unavoidably in some ways a
political act.' Over time, the politics inherent in clemency
decisions have resulted in a patchwork of presidential pardoning
practices that at best can be described as idiosyncratic."' 2 6 Alarm
over not simply the politicization of criminal law, but indeed the
haphazard, arguably erratic politicization of criminal law,
particularly as wielded through the single arm of the executive, has
been accented as well by Professor Love:
[T]he intense competition for partisan advantage in
matters touching on crime control has made
pardoning politically problematic. This was
brought home to the Clinton Administration in the
125 Kobil, supra note 78, at 575.
126 Id. at 601 (quoting Kevin Krajick, The Quality of Mercy, CORRECTIONS
MAG., June 1979, at 46, 52).
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summer of 1999 by the public furor that greeted the
President's offer of clemency to sixteen members of
a Puerto Rican nationalist group ("FALN") who
were serving lengthy prison sentences for terrorist
offenses. The President defended his decision in
terms of "equity and fairness," but it was widely
criticized as a thinly-veiled attempt to curry favor
with Hispanic voters in New York on behalf of his
wife's expected Senate candidacy.1 2 7
The anti-republican, potentially patently partisan
inclination of presidential pardons explains at least in part the
decline of its use over the intervening decades. For instance,
Professor Love does not attribute the stark drop in pardons since
the Ronald Reagan presidency 28 to changes in theory, such as
increased or decreased emphasis on the penology of rehabilitation
contrasted with retribution, nor to any decline in applications for
clemency as such applications remain numerous. 12 9 Nor does there
appear to be an intensifying sentiment that, as Professor Kobil
phrased it, emerging constitution values are rendering "[t]he
clemency power [into] something of a living fossil." 3 0 Rather,
perhaps unsurprisingly given the character of the executive branch,
the notable decline in acts of executive clemency seems motivated
by politics:
It appears more likely that pardon's declining
incidence since 1980 is attributable to the politics of
crime control, a politics that has produced some of
the most potent and divisive electoral issues of the
last thirty years. Since the early 1980s, Republicans
and Democrats have competed for advantage in a
''race to incarcerate," producing a "prison industrial
complex" with a powerful institutional
constituency. Politicians and bureaucrats alike have
been far more interested in feeding the front end of
the justice system through enacting more laws,
127 Love, supra note 1, at 1484 (footnotes omitted).
128 See id. at 1493-94 (culling and assessing statistical data).
129 See id. at 1494-95.
130 Kobil, supra note 78, at 575.
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hiring more prosecutors, and building more prisons,
than in helping people avoid becoming enmeshed in
the system in the first place, creating opportunities
for them to earn their way to freedom, or finding
ways to encourage their reintegration into the
community. It is hard to find a place for pardon in a
system with such priorities.1 3 1
Based on the realpolitik involved, Professor Love's further
observation is worth quoting in full:
Most people today associate pardons with politics
and controversy, and do not know that for much of
our nation's history the pardon power was exercised
regularly and without fanfare to give relief to
ordinary people convicted of garden-variety federal
crimes. Once an integral part of the justice system,
pardon is considered anachronistic in an age
devoted to rules and wary of discretion, a vestige of
a simpler time whose occasional exercise is either
capricious or pointless, or both. Indeed, until quite
recently the prevailing view among criminal justice
practitioners and philosophers was that the time had
come for pardon "silently to fade away-like collar
buttons, [its] usefulness at an end."l32
The foregoing has inspired somewhat exaggerated criticism of the
jurisprudence of pardons and clemency:
13' Love, supra note 1, at 1495-96 (footnotes omitted). Using the Bill Clinton
Administration as an example, Professor Love explicated: "During the first
years of the Clinton Administration, the determination of the White House not to
cede anything to the political opposition on crime issues virtually assured
prosecutors' continued influence over the pardon program in the Department.
Over time, standards for recommending a case for pardon were set higher and
the review process became more rigorous, resulting in a corresponding drop in
the number of pardon cases sent forward to the White House for favorable
action." Id. at 1497 (footnotes omitted).
132 Id. at 1483-84 (quoting KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE,
MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 84 (1989) (other citations omitted).
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[T]he clemency power has failed to evolve with the
rest of the judicial system. United States pardon
attorney John Stanish's observation in 1979 that
"[t]here has never really been much rhyme or
reason to clemencies in the past" is still true with
respect to both federal and state executive clemency
decisions.13 3
Similarly, it seems almost unnecessary and too obvious to
offer that power as broad, deep, and nebulously defined as that
under Article II, Section 2 could easily be subject to abuse both
deliberate and unintended. In good or bad faith, any President or
state's chief executive, especially one with questionable regard for
justice and fairness, could manipulate her enormous clemency
discretion for personal gain, to promote untoward objectives, or
otherwise to attain dishonorable ends unworthy of both that
President's high office and the integrity of the Constitution itself.
As Professor Krent lamented, "Lost in the political reverberations
has been any concern for the wider social implications of imposing
conditions on clemency. Because these conditions restrict the
constitutional rights of the offenders, they may be deeply
unsettling from a civil libertarian perspective. "134
2. Article II, Section 2, and Exercises of State Clemency, are
Constrained by the Strictures of the Due Process Clauses
Yet, even cursory research reveals the predictable answer
to this battery of constitutional and policy concerns. While one
may conceivably claim that "the clemency power has failed to
evolve" as completely and effusively as has "the rest of the judicial
system,"1 3 5 despite initial resistance, the Supreme Court has held,
and the lower courts accordingly have recognized, that while those
offices' discretion is mammoth and attendant restraints are few, no
133 Kobil, supra note 78, at 611 (quoting Krajick, supra note 126, at 53).
134 Krent, supra note 49, at 1668. In particular, Krent noted: "In exchange for
clemency, President Clinton seemingly coerced fourteen of the sixteen FALN [a
radical group centered in Puerto Rico] members into relinquishing rights to
travel, association, and free expression. The conditions even preclude two
sisters, who were among those offered clemency, from maintaining any contact
with each other." Id. (footnote omitted).
135 Kobil, supra note 78, at 611.
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less than any other office or any other lawful power, the
presidency's and states' use of executive clemency must comport
with "due process of law" under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution. Therefore, the Constitution does
not vouchsafe this nation from unwise or impolitic grants of
clemency. Indeed, no constitutional provision accords or was
intended to accord such protections best left to America's political
realms. However, the law of due process-as noted earlier, the
Constitution's single greatest and most potent safeguard against
tyranny, oppression, and injustice-prevents even the
extraordinarily broad discretion attendant to executive clemency
from jeopardizing that which the Constitution was designed to
preserve: liberty. In this singular regard, the Constitution tames
the realm of clemency up to and including pardons, and no more is
required to forestall or to remedy misuses of clemency authority
that abridge liberty except, of course, the actual national will to
constrain any chief executive who would abuse her power.
Professor Krent's prose, then, is hyperbolic because if the
"political reverberations" have been deaf, the constitutional
"reverberations" addressing "concern for the wider social
implications of imposing conditions on clemency" are manifest
and potent.
. All underlying policies supporting a clemency system except
promoting justice are irrelevant to any act of clemency's due
process legitimacy
Oddly, how "due process of law" applies as a check against
untoward use of the clemency authority is related to but one of the
many concepts explaining why authority to exert clemency exists
in the first place. That one relevant idea is: clemency must further
the promotion of justice. While other policies might legitimately
prompt pardons and similar largesse, clemency that frustrates
justice is unconstitutional.
Not unpredictably, consistent with the genesis and
development of many concepts in law and government,
commentators confirm that there never was, nor is there now, a
single dominant reason or justification for the executive's
traditional authority to override the determination of the judiciary
regarding convicted felons. That clemency authority is considered
a privilege of high executive office certainly has its English
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antecedents. Prof. Kobil recounted, for example, certain
significant:
Limitations on executive clemency [mandated by
Parliament in the late 1600s through the early
1700s] did not alter the established practice of
exercising the power for reasons entirely unrelated
to justice... . Kings ... used the clemency power to
win the support of key nobles and clerics during
times of strife--even the outright sale of pardons
was commonplace. Such questionable uses of
clemency prompted widespread criticism of royal
pardoning practices. 1 3 6
Given the many ignoble uses to which clemency may be
put if that power's dominant validation is enhancing the
Executive's personal political goals, it is understandable that the
now prevailing and popular explanations for vesting such singular
power in the Executive are to foster justice and mercy. As the
Supreme Court expressed nearly one-hundred years ago,
"Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness
or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal
law." 1 3 7 Of course, promoting justice and mercy have been policy
foundations underlying executive clemency authority for centuries.
"In his Commentaries, Blackstone said that the Crown's use of the
pardon power to ensure that justice was administered with mercy
was one of the great advantages of monarchy over any other kind
of government, because it softened the rigors of the general
law."1 3 8 Identically, "Coke [like Blackstone] noted that 'mercy
and truth preserve the king, and by clemency is his throne
strengthened."' 1 3 9  Granted, as the foregoing quote evinces,
vouchsafing justice and mercy in substantial measure was
considered instrumental-a means-to help sustain the
monarchy. 140
16 Kobil, supra note 78, at 588 (footnotes omitted).
137 Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
1" Kobil, supra note 78, at 586 (citing, BLACKSTONE supra note 89, at 390-91).
139 Id. (quoting, COKE, supra note 89).
140 See id. at 586 (quoting BLACKSTONE supra note 89, at 398).
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Still, those arguably laudable goals not only place a wise
tempering force against monarchical abuse of power, but further
foster a process of philosophical maturation where mercy and
justice, once more means than ends, have become ends in
themselves to legitimize executive clemency authority.
Accordingly, Alexander Hamilton memorably offered that,
"pardons are important because '[t]he criminal code of every
country partakes so much of necessary severity that without an
easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel."'l
4 1
Similarly, nearly eighty years ago, a Department of Justice survey
and analysis accented that clemency has "historically always been
used ... to take care of cases where the legal rules have produced a
harsh, unjust, or popularly unacceptable result" and that "[s]uch
cases will continue to arise under any legal system. "142
While frequently related, justice and mercy not always are
coterminous and indeed, as scholars have emphasized, may be at
odds. In that regard, a debate remains whether from a policy
perspective clemency is, or should be, considered a function
exclusively or predominately of justice, or of mercy, or of both. If
singularly mercy, clemency is, "separate from if not opposed to
justice." This means "clemency is dispensed to those who actually
deserve punishment but that for reasons of kindness or political
expediency they are given a lesser punishment."1 43
As interesting and seemingly important as this dichotomy
appears, it is in fact of little constitutional moment. As explicated
presently, any and all acts of official clemency must comport with
"due process of law," meaning they may not confound principles
of "fundamental fairness." As such, clemency must be just - fair.
Therefore, as a matter of dominant law, while an act of clemency
may have been motivated as merciful, mercy alone is inadequate;
for even if well meant, mercy may be arbitrary or capricious.
Consequently, to be lawful, that act of clemency must be just.
141 Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1332, 1360 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 74,
at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
142 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES 298 (1939) (quoted in Barkow, supra note 141, at 1360 n.126).
143 David S. Olson, Second-Guessing the Quality ofMercy: Due Process in State
Executive Clemency Proceedings, Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118
S.Ct. 1244 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 1009, 1021 n.92 (1999).
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Thus, justice is the sine qua non of constitutionally legitimate
clemency.
Before addressing due process, it is prudent to mention in
this review of clemency policy that in 1927, the Supreme Court
announced an alternative, additional explanation underlying
executive clemency authority: not to rectify particular instances of
unjust excessive punishment, nor to bestow discrete acts of mercy,
but rather protect the public welfare. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' renowned opinion for the Court in Biddle v. Perovich
provides the overarching rationale that clemency serves, and
should be dispensed, to promote the greater societal good: "A
pardon in our day is not a private act of grace from an individual
happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional
scheme. When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed."l44 To cite one illustrative
instance, discussing Murphy v. Ford,1 4 5 Prof. Kobil explained:
The district court considered whether President
Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon was void because it
was outside the scope of the President's pardoning
power. Without questioning the appropriateness of
its inquiry, the court evaluated Ford's reasons for
pardoning Nixon and concluded that, because the
country was "foundering in the wreckage of
Watergate" and was in the grips of uncontrollable
inflation and an unprecedented energy crisis, the
pardon "was a prudent public policy judgment." 4 6
The Biddle understanding evinced what many scholars
consider a most profound change in clemency theory from
accenting justice or mercy for the affected felon to promoting the
overall welfare of greater American society.1 4 7  Nonetheless,
144 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (citing Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120, 121
(1925)).
145 390 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
146 Kobil, supra note 78, at 616 (quoting Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. at 1374);
see also, e.g., Love, supra note 1, at 1487 n.15 (recounting Watergate and other
instances).
147 See generally I RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 7.5(b), Westlaw
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because due process dominates and because no act of clemency
that does not comport with justice will satisfy due process, the
Biddle perspective is displaced if the particular forgiveness, even if
promoting a good public outcome, nonetheless is arbitrary,
capricious or otherwise unfair, thus comprising an immoral act of
Government.
ii. The Dominance of the Judiciary as a Check on the
Executive's Clemency Prerogative
The prolonged debate over the essential purpose or
purposes of clemency has guided constitutional law addressing to
what degree, if at all, executive clemency is and should be
constrained by the other branches of government. Although there
was some initial contrary jurisprudence, 14 8 a century-and-a-half
ago, the Supreme Court's U.S. v. Klein explained the then-accepted
general conception, "It is the intention of the Constitution that each
of the great co-ordinate departments of the government-the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-shall be, in its sphere,
independent of the others. To the executive alone is [eintrusted the
power ofpardon; and it is granted without limit."1 49
While its declaration that the President's Art. II, sec. 2
powers virtually are unreviewable has been repudiated by the
ascendency of the Due Process Clauses, the Constitution's
ratification history bears out Klein 's pragmatic understanding that
any interference by the co-ordinate branches of government must
be circumspect, indeed limited solely to the unique expertise of the
particular branch. Believing that in essence Congress would enjoy
no such singular expertise under the system recommended to
replace the Articles of Confederation, "Proposals during the
Constitutional Convention that the power be shared with Congress
(database updated Nov. 2017). Of course, while sometimes competing, the
justifications of justice, mercy, and societal welfare often intersect, as indeed
one hopes they would. See generally Barkow, supra note 141, at 1361.
14 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161 (1833) (per Marshall, C.J., for a
unanimous Court) (stating that a pardon may be rejected by the recipient, or
"controverted by the prosecutor, and [then] expounded by the court.").
14 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) ("Unlike probation, pardon and
commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as
such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.").
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were rejected on grounds of efficiency, and on the theory that the
President's personal accountability to the electorate was a
sufficient check on abuses."1 5 0
Thus, the Founders believed that clemency is best vested in
a single officer's ultimate decision, rather than by the vote of
officers or offices spanning the executive and legislative
branches. 1 5 1 Accordingly, with regard to possible legislative
oversight, the simple constitutional standard is that "Congress can
neither limit the effect of [a] pardon nor exclude from its exercise
any class of offenders."l 5 2  The foregoing principle, certainly
accurate as a matter of practical, routine politics, is decreased in
some measure by the constitutional authority of Congress to
impeach and remove federal officers, including presidents, based
essentially on whatever the Legislature feels is proper and
sufficient cause. Thus, the Supreme Court explained nearly a
century ago, "Our Constitution confers full discretion to pardon on
the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse
it."1 5 3 However, in the "improbable" instance of severe executive
misuse, the Constitution's express, "resort [is] to impeachment
rather than to a narrow and strained construction of the clemency
power of the President."l 5 4
If a hands-off standard naturally prevents Congress from
legislatively checking the President's Art. II, sec. 2 prerogative, "A
more difficult issue . . . concerns the authority of the judiciary to
limit the President's clemency power, an issue which pits the
150 Love, supra note 1, at 1486 n.13.
15 "Hamilton argued that the pardon power was vested in 'one man' rather than
'a body of men' for two reasons: first, 'the sense of responsibility is always
strongest in proportion as it is undivided,' and second, 'as men generally derive
confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act
of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or
censure for an injudicious or affected clemency."' Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 74 at 422-23).
152 Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
i13 Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
154 Id. Moreover, it is worth brief note that the Constitution does not vest in the
Executive exclusive authority over clemency, Congress can enact amnesty
statutes so long as such acts do not constrain the President's art. II, sec. 2
authority. E.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896); Pollock v.
Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co. (The Laura), 114 U.S. 411, 414-17 (1885). Thus,
while such legislative power does not limit the Executive's use of clemency, it
emphasizes, consistent with separation of powers, that presidents do not enjoy a
monopoly on bestowing clemency.
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notion that the presidential clemency power should be unfettered
against the principle that the judiciary is responsible for reviewing
the constitutionality of executive actions."1 55  Initially, constraint
identical to that against Congress inured to the Judiciary.
As Chief Justice Taft averred for the Court in Ex parte
Grossman, the Constitution's sole remedy for abuse of Art. II, sec.
2, is impeachment.1 5 6  A quarter-century later, the District of
Columbia Circuit reiterated, "The pardon power is one which the
Constitution expressly vests in the President."l5 7 Consistently, as
one commentator urged, ultimately wrongly but emphatically, "A
presidential pardon is an act of grace, and the pardon applicant has
no due process rights in the process that can be enforced in the
courts." 15 8 Indeed, because clemency is considered a bulwark-a
"check"-against occasional abuse by the Judiciary, 5 9 theorists
argue that it is imprudent, if not unwise, to allow that "checked"
branch to review Executives' decisions to "check" it.1 6 0 Moreover,
control by the other governmental branches, including, of course,
the Judiciary, arguably undermines the "unitary executive" certain
theorists believe the Framers intended. 16 1
' Kobil, supra note 78, at 597.
156 "'Our Constitution,' wrote Taft for a unanimous Court, 'confers full
discretion to pardon on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he
will not abuse it.' If the power were abused, the remedy . . . would be 'resort to
impeachment rather than to a narrow and strained construction of the clemency
power of the President."' Id. (quoting Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121).
1i7 Yelvington v. Presidential Pardon and Parole Attorneys, 211 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (the court will not compel compliance with internal Justice
Department clemency regulations so as to interfere with administration of
pardon power).
158 9B FED. PROC., L. ED. § 22:2123, Westlaw (databased updated Feb. 2018)
(citing Binion v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189 (9th Cii. 1983)).
159 The administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily always wise or
certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt. To
afford a remedy, it has always been thought essential in popular governments, as
well as in monarchies, to vest in some other authority than the courts power to
ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judgments. It is a check entrusted to the
executive for special cases. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120-21.
Io "The courts traditionally have taken the .. . position, that the clemency power
is outside of the adjudicative process. . . . Some have argued that clemency
operates as a check on the courts precisely because it is outside of the
adjudicatory system." Olson, supra note 143, at 1022 (footnotes omitted).
1 See Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency
Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 698, 703 (2012) "It is not for us to determine, and
we have never presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive
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Nonetheless, despite Ex parte Grossman's ardent invective
against any judicial oversight of executive clemency, the Judiciary,
as it must, has confronted and accepted its demanding but
inalienable duty: "Since it is the province of the judiciary to say
what the law is, the courts must be willing to review the
executive's exercise of the clemency power to assure that it
comports with the Constitution."162 Indeed, "the federal
judiciary's relative independence from political pressure renders it
an apt check on the far more politicized executive branch."1 6 3
Understandably, as the Supreme Court affirmed relatively
recently, the judicial check does not include assuring that even an
arguably deserving person receive a reprieve; no felon has an
individual right to extract clemency from the Executive:
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a
convicted person to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural
desire of an individual to be released is
indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being
confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural
safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right:
"[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant
has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." 1 64
The Sixth Circuit expressed the standard succinctly, "No one has a
right to a presidential pardon."' 6 5  Accordingly, as one treatise
pr6cised:
There is no Fourteenth Amendment property or
liberty interest in obtaining a pardon. In terms of
powers of government must be within the full control of the President. The
Constitution prescribes that they all are." (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
162 Kobil, supra note 78, at 616 (footnote omitted).
163 Id.
1" Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979) (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)); see also Conn.
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (quoting Greenholtz).
161 In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 932 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Binion v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir.1983)); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 413 (1993) ('A pardon is an act of grace. ) (quoting United
States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833)).
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the Due Process Clause, a prisoner's expectation
that the prisoner will be pardoned is no more
substantial than an inmate's expectation, for
example, that an inmate will not be transferred to
another prison, and it is simply a unilateral hope. 166
Furthermore, consistent with fundamental principles of
judicial review, constitutional law properly establishes that courts
may not evaluate the policy benefits vel non of any given exercise
of executive clemency. Of course, that restraint is axiomatically
inherent in constitutional separation of powers where, aside from
the occasional instances when reviewing its own common law, the
federal judicial role is not to create policy but rather to determine
either the meaning or the constitutional bona fides of the particular
legislation, regulation or other governmental conduct under
review. Appropriately:
The judiciary is not the branch of government
assigned the task of deciding what is good public
policy; if a presidential pardon is not in the public
interest, it is for the public to say so at the polls (as
they did in the 1976 presidential election, when the
Nixon pardon undoubtedly played a role in Gerald
Ford's defeat).1 6 7
With the foregoing principles understood, judicial review
cannot and properly has not been excluded entirely from the realm
of Art. II, sec. 2. After all, the Judiciary's duty-indeed, arguably
its greatest duty as one jurist exclaimed-is to assure that
governmental actions of every sort and regardless of office
comport with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of which the preeminent is "due process of law." 16 8
Thus, Prof. Strasser rightly concluded:
166 16C C.J.S. Const. Law § 1783, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018)
(emphasis added; citing Dist. Atty's Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557
U.S. 52 (2009); Antia-Perea v. Holder, 768 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2014); Conn. Bd.
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)).
167 Kobil, supra note 78, at 617.
16 "I perceive it to be the highest duty of the Article III courts to guard jealously
their power to adjudicate claims of due process violation." Strople v. Local Bd.
No. 60, 466 F.2d 601, 607 (3rd Cir. 1972) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). As this
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Arguably, due process guarantees afforded by the
United States Constitution apply in the pardon
context as well. The Court made clear in Evitts v.
Lucey[, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985),] that "when a
State opts to act in a field where its action has
significant discretionary elements, it must
nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the
Due Process Clause."l 6 9
Such indeed, is the present state of Art. II, sec. 2, law.
iii. Precedent addressing due process and clemency
The Supreme Court put to rest any lingering doubts in Ohio
Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard,1 70 specifically holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
states to follow their own extant clemency procedures even when
the state has formally commemorated those procedures in statutes,
regulations, executive orders, or judicial rulings. Woodard
determined that while clemency procedures are constitutionally
reviewable, due process considerations do not require the process
the Respondent demanded. For our purposes, however, the
essential lesson is that executive clemency authority is not free
from due process constraints. Limited though those constraints
may be, the Constitution does not accord executive clemency "free
reign." Thus, as always, it falls to the Judiciary, applying the Due
Process Clauses, to discern what are the applicable limitations and
how such apply in any given case.
writing emphasized from the outset, "due process of law" is the "value monism"
of the Constitution; therefore, the courts' greatest obligation is to enforce that
charter's Due Process Clauses. See supra Section II.A.
169 Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the President's Pardon Power, 31 CAP.
U. L. REv. 143, 157 (2003) (symposium). Similarly, clemency expert Daniel
Kobil concluded, "a liberty interest in meaningful consideration may be found in
the Due Process Clause itself, thereby triggering its procedural protections."
Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. RICH L. REv. 201, 222 (1993).
170 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
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There is no majority opinion in Woodard. Rather, the
Court split into three groupings, one comprised of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas, with Chief Justice Rehnquist authoring for
that plurality; a second with Justice O'Connor writing for herself
and Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer; and a sole dissenting-
concurring opinion written by Justice Stevens. The Rehnquist
plurality argued but fell short of a majority-generating fifth vote
that judicial review for constitutional sufficiency would improperly
change the very nature of the clemency process:
Procedures mandated under the Due Process Clause
should be consistent with the nature of the
governmental power being invoked. Here, the
executive's clemency authority would cease to be a
matter of grace committed to the executive
authority if it were constrained by the sort of
procedural requirements that respondent urges.
Respondent is already under a sentence of death,
determined to have been lawfully imposed. If
clemency is granted, he obtains a benefit; if it is
denied, he is no worse off than he was before.1 7 1
Based on the very nature of clemency as, in its words, "a
matter of grace" left entirely to executive discretion, the
Rehnquist-four averred that, unlike criminal trials and sentencing
where "due process of law" is essential, judicial review,
particularly due process review, is inconsistent with traditional
clemency theory and practice:
Clemency proceedings are not part of the trial-or
even of the adjudicatory process. They do not
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
and are not intended primarily to enhance the
reliability of the trial process. They are conducted
by the executive branch, independent of direct
appeal and collateral relief proceedings. And they
are usually discretionary, unlike the more structured
and limited scope of judicial proceedings. While
traditionally available to capital defendants as a
1' Id. at 285 (plurality opinion).
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final and alternative avenue of relief, clemency has
not traditionally "been the business of courts."l72
Although those four justices apparently believed
otherwise,1 7 3 the O'Connor plurality plus Justice Stevens
comprised a majority of five, setting as mandatory constitutional
law that clemency in general, and presumably Art. II, sec. 2 as
well, are constrained by the Due Process Clauses as interpreted by
the Judiciary. Specifically, as Justice O'Connor expressed:
I do not . . . agree with the suggestion in the
principal opinion that, because clemency is
committed to the discretion of the executive, the
Due Process Clause provides no constitutional
safeguards. . . . When a person has been fairly
convicted and sentenced, his liberty interest, in
being free from such confinement, has been
extinguished. But it is incorrect, as Justice
STEVENS' dissent notes, to say that a prisoner has
been deprived of all interest in his life before his
execution. See post, at 1254-1255. Thus, although
it is true that "pardon and commutation decisions
have not traditionally been the business of courts," .
. . and that the decision whether to grant clemency
is entrusted to the Governor under Ohio law, I
believe that the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that some minimal procedural safeguards
apply to clemency proceedings.1 7 4
Justice Stevens essentially agreed with the O'Connor
plurality's due process framework, noting that, "There are valid
reasons for concluding that even if due process is required in
clemency proceedings, only the most basic elements of fair
172 Id. at 284 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
173 E.g., Winfield v. Steel, 755 F.3d 629, 630-31 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc, per
curiam) (the Rehnquist plurality apparently rejected the argument that clemency
decisions may be judicially reviewed for due process sufficiency); See also, e.g.,
Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058, 1061 (10th 1998) (en banc).
174 Woodard, 523 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., with Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, JJ., concurring) (quoting Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464; emphasis in
original).
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procedure are required." 7 5 Accordingly, subsequent courts have
accepted as a constitutional proposition the gist of the O'Connor-
Stevens opinions that because the offices of federal and state
government must comply with, respectively, the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and because acts
of clemency by definition emanate from one or the other
governmental office, such clemency must comport with whatever
"due process of law" may require in that context.1 7 6
While unquestionably and properly regimented by the
strictures of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the general
consensus among courts and commentators, supposedly suggested
by the tenor, if not the text, of the Stevens-O'Connor standard,
avers that the level of due process appropriate to clemency matters
is "low."1 7 7 As the Fifth Circuit expressed, "The low threshold of
judicial reviewability is based on the facts that pardon and
commutation decisions are not traditionally the business of courts
and that they are subject to the ultimate discretion of the executive
power."178 Attempting to explicate what such "low" level of
review entails, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that clemency
procedures and decisions are constitutional unless attendant due
process violations are "grave." 1 7 9 Taking a slightly different tack,
but essentially embracing the same idea, the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits denoted the applicable due process standard as
"minimal" 80 (thereby implying that only a gravely erroneous
clemency decision warrants constitutional reversing or vacating).
175 Id. at 292 (Stevens, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 "Justice O'Connor was the fifth and decisive vote for the plurality opinion.
Thus, her concurrence set binding precedent." Wellons v. Comm'r, Ga. Dept. of
Corr., 754 F.3d 1268, 1269 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) and Swisher Intern., Inc. v. Schafer,
550 F.3d 1046, 1053 (11th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2838 (2009); see
also, Schad v. Brewer, 732 F.3d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam);
Anderson v. Davis, 279 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2002).
'77 E.g., Olson, supra note 143, at 1029.
"1 Faulder v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam).
179 Banks v. Sec'y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 592 Fed. Appx. 771, 773 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied sub nom., Banks v. Crews, 135 S.Ct. 512 (2014).
180 Winfield v. Steel, 755 F.3d 629, 631 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc, per curiam);




The foregoing consensus among the lower courts appears
logical especially because, to illustrate what might constitute
violations, Justices O'Connor and Stevens offered as examples
only the most common and familiar instances. Justice Stevens
urged:
Presumably a State might eliminate this aspect of
capital sentencing entirely, and it unquestionably
may allow the executive virtually unfettered
discretion in determining the merits of appeals for
mercy. Nevertheless, there are equally valid reasons
for concluding that these proceedings are not
entirely exempt from judicial review. I think, for
example, that no one would contend that a
Governor could ignore the commands of the Equal
Protection Clause and use race, religion, or political
affiliation as a standard for granting or denying
clemency. Our cases also support the conclusion
that if a State adopts a clemency procedure as an
integral part of its system for finally determining
whether to deprive a person of life, that procedure
must comport with the Due Process Clause.' 8 1
Similarly, Justice O'Connor opined, "Judicial intervention
might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby
a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant
clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a
prisoner any access to its clemency process."' 8 2  Indeed,
underscoring the purportedly "low" standard of due process
attendant to review of clemency matters, courts have seized upon
the O'Connor plurality's use of the term "Judicial intervention
might, for example, be warranted. . . ." Accenting the word
"might," the Fifth Circuit concluded that the examples the
O'Connor Woodard opinion offered do not even comprise per se
due process violations, but rather arbitrary denials of clemency that
'"' Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., with Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concurring)
(emphasis added).
183 Id. at 274.
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may or may not be unconstitutional depending on the particular
circumstances. 18 4  As that Circuit emphasized in Epps, "these
requirements really are minimal . . . ."s Although in the
minority, some jurists accuse the foregoing courts of reading
Woodard too narrowly. For example, four judges from the Eighth
Circuit emphatically urged, "Justice O'Connor's hypothetical
should not be read to set a firm boundary delineating the only two
cognizable claims of clemency procedures which violate due
process."' 8 6
It is worth briefly accenting and applying here what was
shown in the general discussion of the meaning of due process.
Despite frequent insistence that a gradation of standards exist,
there is no actual thing in constitutional adjudication as "minimal"
or "low" due process, at least insofar as those terms imply that
there is an axis, hierarchy, or pole ranging from marginal to utmost
due process emanating from the Constitution. Yes, at their
discretion, offices of government might provide procedures and
processes exceeding that which is constitutionally required. When
Government accords more process than the Constitution requires,
we can say that what recipients enjoy is greater than minimal
process, but not greater than due process, because constitutional
"due process" comprises exactly what is required under the given
circumstances, no more and no less. If Government accords less, it
violates the Constitution; if it accords more, such excess comprises
largesse.
Thus, due process is neither high nor low, stem nor light,
grave nor minor. Rather, as the Supreme Court famously
explained in Mathews v. Eldridge, "The type of.. . process due ...
is a function of the context of the individual case. Due process 'is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances.' 1 8 7  Likewise, the Court expressed
shortly before Matthews, "due process is flexible and calls for such
184 Turner v. Epps, 460 Fed. Appx. 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
185 Id.
186 Winfield v. Steel, 755 F.3d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc, per curiam)
(Murphy, J., with Bye, Melloy and Kelly, JJ., dissenting).
187 Jones v. La. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of La. Sys., 809 F.3d 231, 236 (5th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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procedural protections as the particular situation demands."' 8 8
Thus, what process or standards actually are due depends on the
given circumstances. Certainly, in some instances the extent and
complexity of constitutionally necessary process may exceed what
other situations necessitate. But, as a matter of constitutional law,
due process is satisfied if the pertinent governmental actor simply
complies with what is required. Thus, from a constitutional
perspective, there is no minimal or low due process, only "due
process of law." 8 9
This more accurate understanding of due process is
essential because it sets both a framework and a tone for
constitutional analysis. If the basic premise courts adopt is that the
applicable due process benchmark is "low" or "minimal," those
courts may well deem almost any procedures or other standards
acceptable out of respect for the reviewed governmental office.
The very idea of low or minimal standards invites not completely
uncritical review, but certainly high deference that dissuades courts
from the searching, in-depth review appropriate for the
Constitution's value monism. Indeed, in similar contexts, courts
have noted that even if official action need only be "rational," the
appropriate governmental office must have chosen its arguably
rational action by taking a "hard look" at the relevant situation and
likely consequences of the chosen action, 1 9 0 an approach that fits
well with constitutional law.'91
Recognizing that due process means what is required under
the circumstances reminds us that, despite any deference owed to
" Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Sys. Contractors
Corp. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 571, 575 (5th Cir. 1998).
'8 Logically, due process analysis includes assessing the "interests at stake in a
given case," Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; and, certainly some "interests" are
more compelling than others. Likely, considered along with other relevant
matters, the more important the interest at stake may be, the more intricate will
be the process needed to vouchsafe that interest.
190 E.g., Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 833
F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016) (interpreting the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332).
19 "In the field of administrative law, for example, courts routinely assess the
procedural adequacy of policy formulation in applying the so-called 'hard look'
doctrine. Indeed, some authorities suggest that the Constitution itself mandates
inquiries of this kind." Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:
Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1687 (2001) (citations omitted).
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the relevant governmental actor, courts must use their singular
knowledge and understanding regarding the meaning and purpose
of the Due Process Clauses to assess with a respectful but critical
and unflinching eye whether, deliberately or inadvertently,
Government has violated "due process of law," the value monism
of the Constitution, thus of America itself. Therefore, although
mistakenly referencing, "the minimal application of the Due
Process Clause," the Tenth Circuit came much closer to
articulating the correct standard: courts must assure that, in any
given instance, "the procedure followed in rendering the clemency
decision will not be wholly arbitrary, capricious or based upon
whim, for example, flipping a coin."192
Consistent with the Judiciary's arguable
mischaracterization of what due process entails, perhaps
expectedly but nonetheless indecorously (at least so far as this
article is concerned), the O'Connor-Stevens Woodard formulation
has received considerable unfavorable critical attention. Indeed,
one detractor seemingly castigated the O'Connor plurality for
purportedly failing to provide that which the abiding principles of
judicial restraint forbids, a full explication of "due process of
law's" applicability to clemency, both state and federal. 193
Moreover, commentators aver that the Court's purportedly "low"
standard, arguably generous to Government, is essentially
toothless. Specifically reviewing what Woodard accepted as due
process compliant, Prof. Olson sighed:
If this low level of procedural protection satisfied
the Court in this case, it is hard to imagine what will
not satisfy it. A court will be likely to step in only
when a governor acts in a blatantly arbitrary or
discriminatory manner and then publicizes that fact.
The chances of this happening seem extremely
low.194
192 Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058, 1061 (10th 1998).
193 "Four out of five justices urging due process protections in clemency
proceedings think that the actual level of protection needed is very low. In
Woodard, Justice O'Connor found that Ohio's clemency proceedings exceeded
the minimum process required by the Due Process Clause, without ever saying
what that minimum is." Olson, supra note 143, at 1029 (emphasis added).
194Id.
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While such critiques may meaningfully criticize as faulty how
Woodard (and subsequent courts) actually have applied the general
due process standard, complaints against the O'Connor-Stevens
overarching due process framework itself are unwarranted.
First, surely it is unreasonable to expect any single judicial
decision to set forth such a clear and comprehensive paradigm of
due process-or presumably any legal idea-that its full meaning
and applications are clear beyond cavil thus rendering applications
to particular scenarios merely mechanical. 19 5 Such would require
almost omniscient abstract capacity coupled with the similar
competence to anticipate and to apprehend every likely, if not
plausible incident. Thus, for instance, "Burkean conservatism
acknowledges that no theory can be perfectly consistent, complete,
or determinate. It does, nonetheless, offer a means of determining
that some sorts of arguments are better than others in ways that
may guide a court's interpretation, even if they do not dictate
particular results."1 9 6 Indeed, "no theory is complete-there are
trap doors everywhere. ... "197
Certainly, if this were not true, the very idea of a
constitutional system of government likely would be unenforceable
because, human frailty coupled with political pressures render
creation and adoption of a complete and explicitly comprehensible
constitution essentially impossible. Similarly, as, "[m]any have
argued . . . the Constitution must be vague and indeterminate in
part to be relevant and useful in future unforeseen and, to the
framers, unforeseeable circumstances. . . . The ambiguity,
vagueness, and flux of language as well as social, cultural, moral,
195 E.g., Michael H. Shapiro, On the Possibility of "Progress" in Managing
Biomedical Technologies: Markets, Lotteries, and Rational Moral Standards in
Organ Transplantation, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 13, 37 (2003) ("no theory can be
complete enough to specify all polar cases and explain just why each is
considered as such.").
196 Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 687 (1994) (referring to the
eighteenth-century British philosopher/politician Edmund Burke) (footnote
omitted).
197 Toni M. Massaro, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet. By
William N. Eskridge, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1564, 1584 (2000) (book review).
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and scientific changes further exacerbate the problem of judicial
review."l98
Furthermore, theory and experience confirm that even with
astonishing comprehension, perspicacity, sentience, and foresight,
the most perceptive and unbiased courts cannot devise complete
definitions nor discern all applications of relevant law because, as
it must be, each litigation is predicated on the given record-at-bar,
comprehensive as such record may be. While expressed many
times, once again Justice Felix Frankfurter provided a quotably apt
synopsis:
Courts are not equipped to pursue the paths for
discovering wise policy. A court is confined within
the bounds of a particular record, and it cannot even
shape the record. Only fragments of a social
problem are seen through the narrow windows of a
litigation. Had we innate or acquired understanding
of a social problem in its entirety, we would not
have at our disposal adequate means for
constructive solution.1 9 9
Therefore, this writing at least has no complaints about any
lack of completeness attending to Woodard's due process standard,
especially as a more complete, applicable, and fully compatible
due process paradigm has been offered herein.2 00 In fact, the
O'Connor-Stevens structure is fully sufficient for its purposes,
leaving, as do essentially all constitutional law opinions, further
explications and applications to future litigation premised on
sufficient records to expound such subsequent determinations. 2 0 1
1" Joseph Grcic, The Supreme Court Decision: Consensus or Coercion?, FED.
LAW., June-2007, at 52, 54 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
'9 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 366 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(quoted in MacKenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 623 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Wisc.
2001)).
200 See supra Part II.
201 See discussion supra Section II.B.4. This assertion must be tempered with
one admonition. The proper exemplar with which to solve due process
problems is the Supreme Court's "dignity" paradigm which it has used sparingly
rather than, as it should, in all cases, and which unnaturally coexists with a
competing and incorrect framework based on "deeply rooted" American
traditions. In all due process matters, the Judiciary should denote the dignity
paradigm as the correct construct.
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The Woodard due process structure, in particular, does three very
apt things. First, it rightfully explains that because executive
clemency power is and ought to be broad, the presumption in any
litigation is that the challenge is infirm; the challenger must prove
that the given executive action confounds "due process of law." 202
Second, Woodard reiterated something obvious but useful:
that unless meeting a judicially established defense, clemency
process and decisions cannot be premised on the most recognizable
and apparently prevalent modes of due process violation. In
particular, the Court mentioned the almost certain infirmity of
"us[ing] race, religion, or political affiliation as a standard for
granting or denying clemency."203
Third and most importantly, Woodard confirmed that any
clemency process or decision must comply with due process in its
broadest form, meaning, "in a case where the State arbitrarily
denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process."204 As
previously proved, Government acting arbitrarily is the very
definition of a due process infraction. 205 Because Justice
O'Connor's definition, either alone or coupled with Justice
Stevens' expositions, encompasses the quintessence due process,
this writing discerns nothing either infirm or lacking.
Consistent not only with what one might expect, but also
with sound constitutional analysis, the courts rarely have
overturned state or federal clemency determinations even when
such seem remarkably ungenerous and steeped in politics. It is not
odd that as with legislation, regulation, and common law, in this
realm of similarly spacious discretion, governmental officials'
202 Of course, that initial burden may switch if the challenger demonstrates that
the act of clemency was based on a clearly unconstitutional consideration. For
instance, not that it would happen, if a governor announced that she would
pardon only white women, simply proving that such is the stated standard would
shift the argument, requiring that governor to prove, if such were possible, that
basing clemency on satisfying two such seemingly irrational statuses
nonetheless is reasonable.
203 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). As earlier quoted, Justice O'Connor
mentioned another form of apparent arbitrariness that violates due process:
"Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme
whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency. .
Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., with Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added).
205 See discussion supra Section II.B. 1.
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grants or denials of clemency, and the processes by which they
make those decisions, may be dubious on many bases such as
wisdom, politics, efficiency, and prudence, but however weak, not
actually unfair in the sense of "due process of law."
That being acknowledged, under the due process dignity
paradigm, one could bring serious constitutional challenges to
significant, longstanding, seemingly unassailable, outwardly
sensible benchmarks such as the earlier discussed holdings that
there is no enforceable right to a pardon or lesser clemency. 2 0 6
Proper due process review equally might delegitimize such
accepted general doctrines as, because it is an "act of grace,"
executives have no duty to use clemency to rectify even undeniable
abuses by courts, 2 0 7 and, executives can "adopt[] a general policy
of not granting clemency in[, for example,] capital cases."2 0 8
However, because the singular point of this writing is to explain
whether a president or comparable state officer may use her
clemency authority to pardon herself or others to gain political
advantage, I leave the other just mentioned interesting topics to
another day.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS BONA FIDES OF EXECUTIVE SELF-
PARDONS AND "BLANKET" PARDONS
As noted in the Introduction, almost immediately into the
start of his term, both Congress through appropriate committees
and the FBI via a special counsel began serious, in-depth
investigations of the newly elected president, Donald Trump.
These investigations concern, inter alia, serious claims that during
his campaign and thereafter Trump and many of his advisors
206 "No one has a right to a presidential pardon." In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922,
932 (6th Cir. 1997).
207 "[W]hile the President may not be entirely free of constitutional constraints
in his exercise of the power, it seems clear that he cannot be legally compelled
to grant a pardon even in case of "evident mistake." Love, supra note 1, at
1501 (quoting Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925)). Indeed, albeit
quivering in a footnote, Love effectively concedes the error of her assertion:
"This is not to say that the President may not have a legally enforceable duty to
consider granting clemency. It is simply to say that his decision on the merits is
not subject to judicial review, except perhaps on Equal Protection grounds." Id.
at 1501 n.63 (emphasis added).
208 Anderson v. Davis, 279 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In re Sapp, 118
F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir.1997)).
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violated Federal law by numerous acts that alone and in tandem
comprise, to use the presently popular term, "colluding" with the
Russian Government. These investigations as well are inquiring
into the legality of Trump's decision to fire FBI Director James
Comey who Trump claims was unfit for that high position.
However, others aver that Trump abused the discretion of his
presidency and engaged in unlawful "obstruction of justice" by
firing Comey after he refused Trump's express requests first to
pledge specific loyalty to Trump, and, second to end inimediately
the FBI's investigation into connections, if any, between Trump's
campaign and Russia.
As of this writing, the various investigations continue with
the expected political ramifications such inquiries tend to
engender. Indeed, as often occurs in such situations, the
investigations in the Trump campaign-early presidency have, in the
words of two critics have "morphed into an open-ended inquiry. It
is examining issues-like Donald Trump's private business
transactions-that are far removed from the Russia question. It
also has expanded its focus beyond the original question of
collusion with the Russians to whether anyone involved in the
Russia investigation has committed some related offense." 2 0 9 To
date at least two individuals under investigation, including Michael
Flynn, a retired, decorated general and former Trump National
Security Advisor, have pled guilty to federal crimes and apparently
have agreed to cooperate with the FBI's inquiry. Claiming that the
investigations essentially are frivolous, purely partisan in nature,
and further claiming that a United States president cannot ever
unlawfully "obstruct justice" by exercising his lawful authority to
fire Federal officers such as FBI directors, many of these critics
urge Mr. Trump to issue a "blanket" pardon covering both himself
and anyone who in any fashion is, was or is claimed to have been
"involved in" any of the subject matters of these investigations. 2 10
As has been mentioned herein, presidents have issued
blanket or "mass" pardons and similar clemency, more commonly
denoted as amnesty, the legality of which have not been reputed.2 1 1
209 David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Begging Your Pardon, Mr. President,
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 29, 2017 2:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/begging-your-pardon-mr-president-1509302308.
21 0 Id.
211 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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However, such self and blanket pardons, indeed apparently no
clemency matters at all have been judicially reviewed under the
due process dignity paradigm urged by this writing. Accordingly,
this article concludes by maintaining that as a matter of
constitutional law, self-pardons and mass pardons are not per se
unlawful, but under the applicable due process dignity paradigm,
the former are unlikely ever to pass muster, and the latter, while
much more likely to be lawful, must still satisfy the requirement of
promoting justice-fairness-sufficiently to dispel any tainting
political or other delegitimizing influences.
A. Because They Inherently Involve Self-Dealings and Self-
Promotion, Self-Pardons Likely Violate the Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution
The matter of self-pardons or other forms of clemency
ordered by the governmental executive for the immediate and
direct benefit of that governmental executive has not been
addressed by the courts and has engendered perhaps
understandably little scholarly comment. As Prof. Rotunda and
Nowak observed:
There is no case law on this subject and there may
never be. But President Nixon-who was pardoned
by his successor whom he had appointed, President
Ford-actually thought of this possibility. On
August 1, 1974, shortly before Nixon resigned, his
aides presented for him various options, one of
which was that Nixon pardon himself and then
resign. Nixon's lawyers "prepared a short
memorandum concluding that a self-pardon would
be legal." Nixon, however, did not take that
alternative. 212
212 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 7.5(d), Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2017) (quoting Brian C. Kalt, Note Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case
Against Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L. J. 779, 779 (1996) (generally concluding that
self-pardons would be unconstitutional due to the conflict of interests).
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While certainly remarked upon in other articles and
treatises, the two leading detailed commentaries on the matter
consist of an insightful student-note, published roughly twenty
years ago by the Yale Law Journal, arguing that self-pardons are
unconstitutional,2 13 and a dual-authored 1999 Oklahoma Law
Review article that, while urging self-pardons are legitimate,
apparently was drafted prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Woodard that clemency matters are subject to "due process of law"
evaluation. 2 14 Accordingly, the Nida-Spiro analysis is completely
devoid of Due Process Clauses analysis which, this writing politely
urges, renders their legal conclusions questionable not with regard
to whether self-pardons are constitutionally permissible, but rather
the virtual un-reviewability of such pardons those authors aver.
Both articles aptly recognize that, based solely on its text,
the Constitution's Art. II, sec. 2, strongly implies that self-pardons
(and for that matter, blanket pardons) are among the President's
options when considering pleas for, in that provision's term,
"reprieves and pardons." Indeed, Profs. Nida and Spiro correctly
assert that "A textual interpretation of the Pardon Clause provides
the strongest argument that a self-pardon is not prohibited by the
Constitution. The concept of a textual interpretation is extremely
lucid and direct, but its significance is essential."2 1 5 In particular,
Kalt explained the idea as an example of the well-known canon of
interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning "the
expression of one thing excludes the other:" 2 1 6
There are two limits to the President's power
explicit in the Pardon Clause. First, the power
applies only to "Offences against the United
States." Second, "Cases of Impeachment" are
excluded. The "simple" reading of the text points to
these explicit restrictions and concludes that what is
left, by the principle of expressio unius, is not
restricted. If the President did not have the power
to pardon himself the expressio unius reading says,
213 Kalt, supra note 212.
214 Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury:
A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 197
(1999).2151 d. at 216.
216 Kalt, supra note 212, at 791 n.73.
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the Framers would have added "and cases
involving himself." 217
Perhaps unkindly, Kalt calls the application of the
expressio unius canon, "simplistic and inaccurate." 218 While this
writing agrees that an appeal to Art. II, sec. 2's text alone is an
insufficient basis to determine the constitutional bona fides of
executive self-pardons, "The Supreme Court has stated that the
pardon power is plenary, and when interpreting it, one should look
to the text to determine its authority." 219 Concurrently, aside from
Art. II, sec. 2:
The Constitution does not contain any other words
regarding pardons, and it does not contain any text
specifically restricting the President's ability to self-
pardon.
As one commentator has stated, "[t]he
Constitution provides no limitation on the pardon
power, and it has been consistently interpreted to be
virtually unlimited." The only limitation is the
restriction on impeachment, and if the Framers had
intended the text to restrict the pardon power even
more, they most likely would have made this
intention apparent from the plain meaning of the
Constitution. For instance, to restrict self-pardoning,
the Framers could have included a clause similar to
the following: Power to grant reprieves and pardons
for offenses against the United States, except in
cases of impeachment and against oneself.220
Given the constitutional text coupled with its British
origins, and its general purposes, there is nothing direct in the
Constitution forbidding self-pardons, and much emanating from
the executive discretion associated with clemency to justify self-
pardoning as within the realm of clemency. Still, Kalt properly
217 Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
218 Id.
219 Nida & Spiro, supra note 214, at 216.
220 Id. at 217 (quoting Peter Ferrara, Commentary, Could President Pardon
Himsef?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996 at A-14).
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instructS 221 that textualism does not eschew contextualism, that is,
investigators must consult the full structure and context of the
Constitution to understand the meaning of any given provision.2 2 2
Indeed, with remarkable prescience as his article pre-dates
Woodard, Kalt accented that consulting Art. II, sec. 2 alone does
not take into account how other provisions, particularly the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses might mitigate that text.2 2 3
By contrast, as mentioned above, the Nida-Spiro work, seemingly
written and submitted during the year of, but prior to the issuance
of Woodard, makes no mention whatsoever of the Fifth
Amendment and how that Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which includes an implied guarantee of equal protection, 2 2 4 might
affect Art. II, sec. 2.
We know from Part II that even within the generous
discretion of clemency, "due process of law" requires that acts of
pardon or other forgiveness must promote justice, that is must be
neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor otherwise unfair. Under the
Supreme Court's dignity paradigm, which properly incorporates
albeit without provenance Kantian moral philosophy, no clemency
may treat the recipient or others "merely as means" and not as
"ends in themselves." Thus, even when motivated by and actually
promoting beneficent or constructive goals, clemency that demeans
the dignity of any individual is, using due process parlance,
unfair-arbitrary or capricious-and, thus, is unconstitutional.
As the immediate topic is executive self-pardons, it is now
apt to accent a vital corollary to Kant's categorical imperatives that
inform due process fairness. 2 2 5  Importantly, in their social
interactions, individuals owe a moral duty not only to respect the
innate dignity of those with whom they interact but owe as well
that very duty to themselves. One must respect one's own dignity
as one must respect the dignity of others. Kant entitled this codicil
221 Kalt, supra note 212, at 791-93.
222 As the District of Columbia Circuit pr~cised the familiar standard, "We agree
... that our inquiry begins with the words of the statute. But a word's 'ordinary
understanding' is not always controlling. Words draw meaning from context."
Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 225
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing U.S. CONST. art. III, §1, establishing the structure
of the federal judiciary as an example).
223 Kalt, supra note 212, at 791-93.
224 See discussion supra Part II.
225 See generally supra Section II.B.3.
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to his theory of human dignity the "duty of rightful honor," which
states, "Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the
same time an end for them." 226 For instance, while surely one may
contract one's labor even for a relatively small fee, one may not
voluntarily enslave oneself to others. One must be one's "own
master." 227 Accordingly, if they are to be constitutional, executives
cannot issue self-pardons that violate the "duty of rightful honor,"
which, in essence, is what Kalt believes any self-pardon entails.
To better understand the due process jurisprudence inherent
in the duty of rightful honor, reference to the "class-of-one" theory
is useful. Commonly due process (and often attendant equal
protection) litigation concerns governmental actions affecting large
or moderately sized classes of individuals. Nonetheless, because
the protections of the Due Process Clauses inure to individuals, not
exclusively groups, 2 2 8 the Supreme Court reaffirmed very recently,
"Laws narrow in scope, including "class of one" legislation, may
violate the Equal Protection Clause if arbitrary or inadequately
justified.229
Thus, less than a year ago of this writing, the Judiciary
reiterated unequivocally that equal protection principles, which we
now understand are part of "due process of law," 2 3 0 simply but
magnificently proscribe "arbitrary or inadequately justified"
governmental conduct.
While perhaps properly informing both the design and
implementation of remedies, surely it makes no difference whether
Government directs such untoward, indeed unconstitutional
behavior against the entire population, against one group large or
small, or against an unfortunate but no less dignified individual.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit equally recently and equally correctly
226 Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 795, 811 (2003) (quoting Immanuel Kant, The
Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF
IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 392 [6:236] (Mary J. Gregor ed. &
trans., 1996).
227 Bayer, supra note 40, at 903 n.160. Equally, suicide is immoral because the
self is treating the self not as an "end," but as a disposable object with no
inherent worth. See Bharat Malkani, Dignity and the Death Penalty in The
United States Supreme Court, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 145, 181 (2017).
228 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
229 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 n.27 (2016) (emphasis
added).
230 See supra Section II.A.
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summarized the "class-of-one" doctrine: "The class-of-one label is
somewhat misleading because what distinguishes these cases isn't
necessarily the fact that the plaintiff is the only one harmed....
The distinguishing element in this kind of equal-protection claim is
that the plaintiff claims that the law's 'improper execution through
duly constituted agents' is unconstitutional. "231
As the foregoing citations evince, the main instructive
precedent is the remarkably short Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech,2 3 2 holding that the respondents stated a cognizable
constitutional claim that the Village imposed arbitrary and
irrational zoning requisites upon them alone. 2 3 3  The Olechs
asserted that Willowbrook's heretofore unknown 33-foot easement
demand was "irrational and wholly arbitrary"; and, "that the
Village's demand was actually motivated by ill will resulting from
the Olechs' previous filing of an unrelated, successful lawsuit
against the Village; and that the Village acted either with the intent
to deprive Olech of her rights or in reckless disregard of her
rights."2 34 While the allegation of discriminatory, hostile animus
might seem vital to the Olechs' case, the Court ruled that the bare
claim of arbitrariness was sufficient to support their suit. "These
allegations, quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation,
are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal
protection analysis. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, but do not reach the alternative theory of 'subjective ill
will' relied on by that court." 2 35
This is not to imply that untoward intent-"ill will" and its
like-is irrelevant. Indeed, Justice Breyer argued that, regarding
constitutional matters in general but specifically addressing the
Olech claim, governmental ill will or vindictiveness are reliable
factors "to distinguish unconstitutional differences in zoning
231 Monarch Beverage Co. v. Cook, 861 F.3d 678, 682 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis added) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000)).
232 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
233 "The Village at first conditioned the connection [of respondents' property to
municipal water supply] on the Olechs granting the Village a 33-foot easement.
The Olechs objected, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement
from other property owners seeking access to the water supply." Id. at 563.
234 Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately the Village relented, but finally requiring
only the usual 15-foot easement did not moot the Olechs' claim.
235 Id.
162 Vol. 9:95
2017 DUE PROCESS BONA FIDES OF PARDONS
variances and allowing zoning variances to others that often mean
taking each petitioner's unique circumstances into account." 236
Rather, Olech underscores that, while certainly relevant evidence,
bad intent is not a sine qua non to plead and prove due process and
similar violations. The relevant question always is whether the
record evinces that, regardless whether purposefully or
inadvertently the governmental actor or office acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, or otherwise unfairly. As the Ninth Circuit
explained:
By looking for evidence of the [City of Chicago]
Commissioners' personal animosity towards
[Appellant] Gerhart, the district court incorrectly
analyzed Gerhart's "class of one" claim, which does
not require a showing of the government officials'
subjective bad feelings towards him. Gerhart does
not need to demonstrate that the Commissioners
harbored ill will towards him in order to meet the
"intent" requirement of his "class of one" claim.
Instead, Gerhart must show that the Commissioners
intended to treat him differently from other
applicants.2 37
Similarly, depending on the given context, it may not even
be necessary for a litigant to prove that the challenged
governmental action actually treated her differently from others.
All that is required, as accented above, is to prove that the
judicially reviewed official conduct itself-either standing alone or
when contrasted with other relevant acts-is arbitrary or otherwise
unconstitutional:
In a class-of-one equal-protection case, it may not
be clear that the challenged governmental action
entails any classification at all. Identifying a
236 Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring). Likewise, the Seventh Circuit opined,
"Several of our cases have suggested that a showing of subjective ill will can be
useful in distinguishing between ordinary errors and discriminatory denials of
equal protection." Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 748 n.2 (7th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
237 Gerhart v. Lake Cty., Montana, 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted).
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similarly situated comparator is a way to show that
disparate treatment in fact has occurred and sets "a
clear standard against which departures, even for a
single plaintiff, [can] be readily assessed." In
contrast, where (as here) the plaintiff challenges a
statute or ordinance that by its terms imposes
regulatory burdens on a specific class of persons (in
this case, beer distributors), there's no need to
identify a comparator; the classification appears in
the text of the statute itself.238
Granted, courts have been perhaps miserly if not wrongful,
limiting in a few contexts unrelated to the subjects discussed in this
article, the coverage of Olech.2 39 It is worth repeating, therefore,
that mere months ago both the highest and intermediate appellate
levels reconfirmed the viability of the "class-of-one" concept,
emanating as it does from the inviolate due process principle that
arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unfair governmental acts and
actions are unconstitutional.2 4 0
Based essentially on these principles, although pre-dating
many of the just discussed precedents, Kalt grippingly argues that
self-pardons, essentially a class-of-one, constitute unconstitutional
"self-dealings":
The federal government is structured to prevent
self-dealing, as evidenced by several constitutional
provisions. A member of Congress, for instance,
cannot simultaneously hold another federal office,
and cannot resign to take a job that was created or
whose pay was increased during that term of
238 Monarch Beverage Co. v. Cook, 861 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
239 E.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601-09 (2008)
("class-of-one" concept not applicable to public employment litigation); Flowers
v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) ("[W]e
conclude that while a police officer's investigative decisions remain subject to
traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a
class-of-one equal protection claim.").
240 See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 n.27 (2016);
Monarch Beverage Co. 861 F.3d at 682 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2017); Geinosky v. City
of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Congress. [U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2;] Congress
cannot legislate a pay raise for itself that takes
effect before the next congressional election, [U.S.
Const. amend. XXVII.] and the presidential salary
cannot be increased without an intervening
presidential election. [See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.
7. ] The President also cannot receive any other
"emolument" from the United States besides his
salary. [also in, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.] In
other words, federal lawmakers cannot create or
enhance plush, high-paying government jobs for
themselves, at least not without letting the voters
review the decision. 2 4 1
In response, Nida and Spiro counter that that self-pardons may not
be self-dealings entirely but may be designed for the public
good.24 2 They undoubtedly are correct; but, by not addressing in
their article any due process considerations, Nida and Spiro cannot
account for the fact that governmental actions, including grants of
clemency, may be unconstitutional even if supported in large
measure by laudable, lawful goals and effects. That presidents and
governors may self-pardon not merely to protect themselves from
justly deserved legal detriments, but earnestly to promote, and
actually promote the "public good," does not mean that viewed in
toto, any given self-pardon is not unconstitutional. If the particular
chief executive's self-pardon violates the duty of rightful honor,2 4 3
if the executive treats herself merely as a means, not as an end in
herself, then that self-pardon is unconstitutional no matter how
much arguable societal good it happens to engender.
Insofar as the executive seeks benefits, rewards, and
pleasure, the self-pardon is pure self-dealings-similar to those
analogized by Kalt. Likely, the purposes of self-pardons are to
benefit the self-pardoner by relieving her of the numerous
disadvantages, impairments, and humiliation attendant in criminal
investigations and trials.2 4 4  Likely, most self-pardons are
241 Kalt, supra note 212, at 794.
242 Nida & Spiro, supra note 214, at 219.
243 See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
244 This writing accents "being a suspect" because, even with a self-pardon, the
given executive still might be a target of, or at least a subject to, the criminal
investigation of others. A self-pardon will not immunize the executive from her
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motivated predominately, if not completely, by the given
executive's desire to self-deal. As such, self-pardons should be
judicially reversible under Woodard as due process violations. 2 4 5
To demean oneself in that manner-to substantially shield oneself
from the disapprobation of lawful investigations not through merit
such as proving one's innocence, but by the fortuitous device of
clemency authority-is to dodge justice. Such dodging certainly is
immoral because the particular executive breaches her duty of
rightful honor by using herself, in this case, her office, as a means
to avoid justice. By contrast, had she used herself as an end in
herself, her innate dignity would have required her to cooperate
regardless of her predilection to gain the comfort and refuge of
eluding the investigation. 2 4 6
Based on the preceding discussion, Kalt is correct in that if
self-pardons are effectively and predominately acts of self-dealing,
they are unconstitutional.2 4 7 However, the question becomes, what
if a self-pardon is justifiable as an act of justice?
B. Self-Pardons as Acts of Justice
In addition, and certainly related to the issue of self-
dealings, Kalt argues that self-pardons are per se unconstitutional
as acts of self-judging.2 4 8 James Madison set forth that proposition
in his famous exclamation, "No man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
duty to participate in any official investigation that comports with "due process
of law." In that regard, by being investigated despite the self-pardon, the
executive might still experience considerable embarrassment and tangible
detriments. Such detriments might be diminished respect and diminished
capacity to serve in office, as well as loss of opportunities (economic and
noneconomic) once out of office.
245 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., with Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
246 Recall that morality requires pursuing "the right," not "the good." See supra
Section II.B.3. Any President or governor under investigation likely would
think it "good" to avoid that investigation and any adverse consequences. Thus,
using a convenient device such as her unique authority to grant clemency would
be very attractive. However, because doing so would be immoral, it would
violate the duty of rightful honor, the executive must attain "the right" by not
self-pardoning.
247 Kalt, supra note 212.
24 81 d. at 806-07.
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and not improbably, corrupt his integrity." 2 4 9  Quoting Supreme
Court precedent, Kalt fortified his argument by accenting the
axiomatic constitutional principle that no person under the
jurisdiction of the United States is "above the law." 250 "No man in
this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of
the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it." 2 5 1
As a general matter, this writing agrees with Kalt.
However, as has been accented, "due process of law" takes cases
one-at-a-time, judging each on its own merits albeit in light of
many overarching, highly abstract principles. Indeed, the only
immutable proposition of due process analysis is that immoral
governmental action is, likewise, per se unconstitutional.2 5 2 In the
improbable situation that a self-pardon truly is an act of justice, it
will be constitutional despite any attendant self-dealings.
One unlikely scenario, for example, would be if a given
investigation indisputably has been instituted and instigated in
ways that no rational person who understands the Supreme Court's
dignity paradigm could deny violates the moral meaning of "due
process of law." 253 Despite its manifest constitutional infirmity,
neither Congress nor the courts will halt, alter, or otherwise
address the particular investigation. In such a case, the marked
injustice of the investigation would support a self-pardon to allow
249 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
250 Kalt, supra note 212, at 807 (quoting, United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
220-21 (1882)); see also, e.g., U.S. v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327, 342 (4th Cir.
2013); Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2000). See also, Mark
Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the
United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 150 (2002) (footnotes omitted)
(arguing that the special status and powers of a sitting president renders self-
pardons seemingly acts of someone "above the law.").
25 See Lee, 106 U.S. at 220-21.
252 See generally, Bayer, supra note 9 (arguing that it is government's
immutable, non-delegable duty to comport with the moral requisites of "due
process of law" no matter what the resulting outcome, even the destruction of
the Nation itself).
253 For example, suppose Jane Doe is America's first female and second
African-American president. Based on racial and sexual animus, and nothing
but, either Congress, or the FBI, or both, institute a wide-ranging but entirely
sham investigation of Doe and her closest associates, predicated on deliberately




the duly elected executive to continue her term of office. Granted,
a corrupt Congress might nonetheless impeach and even convict
the wrongfully-investigated president. Moreover, even absent
impeachment, the self-pardon alone would not necessarily end the
corrupt investigation and its untoward impacts on the given
presidency. Still, because the investigation is unjust, and because
there appears to be no other pragmatically available remedy, a self-
pardon would not be immoral and, therefore, not
unconstitutional.254
C. Amnesty, Blanket Pardons, and Due Process
The discussion above on self-pardons also applies to
amnesty. This writing will not quarrel with the assertion that,
"Amnesties (or group pardons) are a great American tradition
dating back to George Washington. ."255 Moreover, courts have
recognized that, as with other forms of clemency, amnesties are
judicially reviewable for constitutional adequacy.2 5 6 The clear and
now expected answer is that large-scale pardons or other forms of
class-wide clemency, even covering persons unknown and then-
254 Under this writing's theory, the Judiciary could review the foregoing self-
pardon. Because a corrupt judiciary is involved in the relevant scenario, one
might suppose that, just as it had wrongfully refused to fix the infirm
investigation, the reviewing courts would declare the self-pardon
unconstitutional. Until finally leaving office, this might lead to a lengthy cycle
of self-pardons, judicial overturning, and more self-pardons when the affected
president refuses to abide by the court orders overturning the earlier self-
pardons. Such simply reaffirms that no matter how well written and well
respected it may be, the Constitution ultimately is no better than the will to
enforce it.
255 P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Preparing the Pardoning Power for the 21st Century, 12
U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 446, 479 (2016) (footnote omitted). To offer one prominent
example, "As a means of sapping the strength of the rebellion, Washington
offered blanket pardons to those who would lay down their arms." Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L. J. 541, 641 n.444 (1994) (citation omitted).
256 See e.g., Tate v. Dist. of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(District of Columbia rationally could institute a program granting amnesty to
persons who have received parking tickets but, to prevent severe loss of income
and to foster other legal purposes, limit that amnesty to persons who received
parking citations before January 1, 1997); Luck v. D.C. Parole Bd., 996 F.2d
372, 374 (D.C. Cir.1993) (per curiam) (to alleviate prison overcrowding,
government may establish parole program with reasonable requirements and
limitations).
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unknowable, are not per se unconstitutional under the principles set
forth in Part III, particularly the Supreme Court's dignity
paradigm. Therefore, amnesties to advance sound public policy, to
benefit the nation, or to bestow mercy on the recipients are
constitutional, but only if they promote justice. Because mercy
and justice (or public policy and justice) do not always coexist, but
rather can compete or even oppose each other, any act of
forgiveness predicated on mercy or the "public good" must be
sufficiently defensible to comport with "due process of law."
For example, suppose ten very popular politicians, duly
convicted of unlawfully corrupt practices, are sentenced to lengthy
prison terms. Certainly, a blanket pardon would be invalid under
the dignity paradigm if the executive sought to curry favor with
powerful individuals or the public in general who happen to like
the corrupt ten. Such would be the very type of self-dealings
already proven to be unconstitutional in clemency matters.2 57 Even
if freeing the ten convicts assuaged violent protests and civil
disobedience, such clemency would be immoral because the ten
would be freed not because they deserve freedom, but to prevent
unlawful violence. As we know from our study of constitutional
morality,2 5 8 answering immoral conduct with immoral conduct is
unconstitutional.2 5 9
Similarly, liberating them as acts of mercy would also be
wrongful, unless, under principles of justice, they deserve such
mercy. For instance, if felons suffering terminal illnesses who
likely have but three months to live are routinely freed before fully
serving their sentences, then pardons for such felons (who
inexplicably are denied such sentence mitigations) would promote
the due process justice of equal protection of the law and customs.
By contrast, if the convicted ten have been sentenced to
unusually and undeservedly long sentences, or if subsequent fact-
257 See supra Section IV.A.
258 See supra Part III.
259 That is why, for instance, convicted felons are entitled to due process of law
regarding, inter alia, their incarcerations. That they have been convicted of
unlawful, thus immoral, acts does not permit the Government to treat them
merely as means-like inanimate objects that may be used, even abused, and
discarded at will. Convictions may morally justify loss of certain liberties, as
imprisonment itself evinces. But, because prisoners do not lose their innate
human dignity due to their imprisonment, their treatment while imprisoned must
comport with due process morality.
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finding reveals that their sentences are unduly harsh, absent other
extenuating circumstances, a blanket pardon would promote justice
and, thus, be constitutional. In sum, under the Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution, even with the broad discretion
accorded to the President under Art. II, sec. 2, no form of clemency
is either per se constitutional or per se unconstitutional. Rather, as
Woodard aptly ruled, pardons, commutations, amnesty, and other
clemency is lawful under the Constitution if comporting with "due
process of law."
V. CONCLUSION
If Donald Trump decides to grant clemency regarding the
extant investigations of Congress and the FBI, such amnesty must
comport with Art. II, sec. 2, as informed by the Fifth Amendment.
Given Mr. Trump's apparent disinclination to understand the
presidency-or at least his presidency-as constrained by the
Constitution, it is unclear whether, should he bestow clemency on
himself, on others, or on both, he will take "due process of law"
into consideration. Mr. Trump has vehemently and frequently
expressed his conclusion that these investigations are not only
groundless, but essentially immoral (indeed, he may think
unconstitutional) attempts by his political opponents to weaken or
destroy his rightfully won incumbency. There are commentators
who agree, and many who do not. If indeed these investigations
and their fruits are constitutionally infirm, then this president may
have a firm basis to grant extensive clemency. Of course, the
assertions of Trump and his supporters cannot, by themselves,
prove such infirmity. Thus, if Trump pardons or otherwise grants
acts of forgiveness for himself or others-as many believe he
might-that clemency should be deemed unconstitutional, no
matter how ardently he bemoans that he and his minions are beings
treated unfairly. Conversely, if, by independent and unbiased
proof, he can show that his acts of clemency comport with due
process morality, meaning, fairness, and justice-as explicated in
this article-such clemency would be constitutional. On that,
frankly, this author is, at a minimum, skeptical.
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